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SECTION 4.01 OF THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE'S CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PROJECT:
RESTATEMENT OR
MISSTATEMENT?
WILLIAM J. CARNEY*
INTRODUCTION
The American Law Institute's (ALI's) corporate governance project'
has generated the most heated debate in the history of that distinguished
institution.2 Critics claim that the document is a radical proposal for
* Of counsel, Long, Aldridge & Norman, Atlanta, Georgia (on leave as Charles Howard
Candler Professor of Law and co-Director of the Law & Economics Program, Emory University.
The author wishes to thank Professors Fred S. McChesney of Emory and Jonathan R. Macey of
Cornell for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper, and John W. Spotts, Emory Law
School, 1987, for his assistance with the research fjr this article. This article is based on a mono-
graph prepared for the National Legal Center for the Public Interest, whose support is gratefully
acknowledged. While this article is directed at questions of the proper role and liabilities of directors
generally, it has implications for directors of closely held firms as well. It would unduly extend the
article to discuss the particulars of those questions. I have previously argued that, the major
problems of the closely held firm involve conflicts among co-owners over distributions and invest-
ments in the firm. Carney, The Theory of the Firm: Investor Coordination Costs, Control Premiums
and Capital Structure, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 1 (1987). Others have also concluded that board decisions
in closely held corporations are much more likely to involve questions of conflicts of interest among
shareholders (and their directors) than more traditional business judgment questions. See, ag.,
Peeples, The Use and Misuse of the Business Judgment Rule in the Close Corporation, 60 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 456 (1985).
1. American Law Institute [hereinafter ALI], Principles of Corporate Governance and Struc-
ture: Restatement and Recommendations, Tentative Draft No. 1, (1982), [hereinafter T.D. No. 1];
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, Tentative Draft No. 2, (1984)
[hereinafter T.D. No. 2]; Principles of Corporate Governancea Analysis and Recommendations, Ten-
tative Draft No. 3 (1984) [hereinafter T.D. No. 3]; Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and
Recommendations, Tentative Draft No. 4 (1985) [hereinafter T.D. No. 4]; Principles of Corporate
Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, Tentative Draft No. 5 (1986) [hereinafter T.D.No. 5];
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, Tentative Draft No. 6 (1986)
[hereinafter T.D. No. 6] Principles of Corporate Governance Analysis and Recommendations, Tenta-
tive Draft No. 7 (1987) [hereinafter T.D. No. 7]; and Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis
and Recommendations, Tentative Draft No. 8 (1987) [hereinafter T.D. No. 8]. Other less official
drafts have also appeared, such as Discussion Draft No. 1 (1985) and Council.Draft No. 7, which have
not been fully considered by the Council of the ALI and therefore do not represent the position of
the Institute on any of the issues dealt with in those drafts.
2. Symposia discussing the project are listed infra note 66. T.D. No. 1; T.D. No. 2; T.D. No.
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reforming corporate law in a way that increases legal intrusions into the
management of business, while supporters claim that the document is
fairly reflective of much of the existing law, and that it clarifies and sim-
plifies that law.3 Because the two camps often seem to use (or are ac-
cused of using) different "modes of discourse," reconciliation of their
views often seems hopeless.4
This article focuses on what thus far has been the most heated part of
the debate-the ALI's treatment of the duties and liabilities of corporate
directors, set out in section 4.01 of the Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance.5 My thesis is, in part, like Seligman's, that the project is a creature
of its genesis, and that changing times and attitudes have led to different
reactions to these proposals.6 Unlike Seligman, however, I ultimately
agree with the critics that section 4.01 represents a change in the "real
law" governing directors.
My thesis is that events of the 1960's and '70's led to attempts by both
corporate officials and their attorneys to fend off what they saw as radical
law reform, focused on federal chartering, with a series of aspirational
documents intended to reassure critics that corporate managers and their
attorneys were good and responsible citizens who were aware of their
responsibilities.7 Accepting Berle & Mean's view of their own power,
3; T.D. No. 4; T.D. No. 5; T.D. No. 6, supra note 1. This criticism is not unique to the corporate
governance project. Several years ago Professor W. Noel Keyes argued that the second series of
Restatements had been transformed from faithful statements of existing law into reform documents,
often without the candor to admit that their statements of governing law were contrary to prevailing
rules. Keyes, The Restatement (Second): Its Misleading Quality and A Proposalfor Its Amelioration,
13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 23 (1985). But see Wade, The Restatement (Second): A Tribute to its
Increasingly Advantageous Quality, and an Encouragement to Continue the Trend, 13 PEPPERDINE
L. REV. 59, 83 (1985) (arguing that the Restatement (Second) has followed a practice of stating
clearly in its comments or in the reporter's notes when a minority position has been adopted as the
black letter).
3. The initial reaction to the corporate governance project is traced in Keyes, supra note 2, at
4345.
4. Eisenberg, Shortcomings of the Arguments Against Modernizing Corporate Law, 9 DEL, J.
CORP. L. 626, 628 (1984) [hereinafter Modernizing Corporate Law] and New Modes of Discourse in
the Corporate Law Literature, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 582, 589-90 (1984) [hereinafter New Modes of
Discourse]. For a reply, see Baysinger & Butler, Modes of Discourse in the Corporate Law Literature:
A Reply to Professor Eisenberg, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 107 (1987) [hereinafter Reply]. See also Selig-
man, A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing: The American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance
Project, 55 GEO. WAsH. L. Rnv. 325, 344-50 (1987).
5. Section 4.01 appears in its various permutations in T.D. No. 1, T.D. No. 3, and T.D. No, 4,
supra note 1.
6. Cf. Seligman, supra note 4, at 328-344.
7. "Instead of demanding a better definition of the putative problem or attention to the dis-
tinctions among goals of particular reforms, they [representatives of the business community] have
[Vol. 66:239
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corporate managers claimed the mantle of good citizenship that Berle
had ultimately bestowed upon them.'
The articulation of these aspirations of responsibility created, for the
first time, a dichotomy between legally oriented statements of proper
conduct ("conduct rules"), and the rules under which courts had previ-
ously operated ("decision rules").9 When the ALI began its process of
restatement, it was easy enough to seize upon the aspirational statements
of behavior, the conduct rules, as if they were indeed the decision rules
applied by the courts.
After briefly tracing this history, I will demonstrate how far the ALI
has departed from existing law by examining the cases cited by the re-
porters for their statements of law. This review will demonstrate that the
reporters have merged the decision rule into the recently developed con-
duct rule, thus fundamentally altering the legally applicable rules. I will
conclude by examining the damage caused by such an approach, both in
the context of particular judicial decisions and in the wider response of
markets to announcements of these changes.
Part I begins with a brief recounting of the historical background of
criticism of corporate law, and an examination of the development of the
corporate governance project, its stated goals and the attitudes reflected
in the tentative drafts. Part II argues that no legal support exists for the
ALI's view of the role of the corporate board as a careful and independ-
ent monitor of potential law violations; indeed the ALI has built contra-
dictory notions of the functioning of the board into its own statement of
legal principles. Part III argues that the ALI's formulation of the direc-
tors' duty of care, while consistent with much dicta, imposes a stricter
sought to determine what concessions might appease the critic." Winter, The Development of the
Law of Corporate Governance, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 524 (1984).
"It is as though a large fraction of the community of business leaders wants to make preemptive
concessions, as if they meet not to plan a fight against wrongheaded movement but to discuss how
best to negotiate the terms of surrender." Id. at 525 (quoting Judge Robert Bork).
8. The seminal work is A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932). Berle's view of managers as responsible and professional custodians for the pub-
lic weal appears in A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954). It has been
observed by others how eager managers have been to adopt the mantle of "business statesmanship".
See, e.g., Manne, The Higher Criticism of the Modern Corporation, 62 COLUM L. REv. 399, 413-14
(1962).
9. See generally Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 625 (1984). Conduct rules, in this dichotomy, are rules addressed
to the general public (or corporate directors, in the case of the duty of care), while decision rules are
addressed to the officials who apply the rules (judges, in the case of the business judgment rule).
1988]
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standard than the actual holdings support. Part IV argues that the stan-
dard of judicial review implicit in the ALI's formulation of the business
judgment rule would inject judicial review far into corporate decision-
making, where the judicial process is unsuitable. This approach reflects
either a profound mistrust of corporate processes or a misunderstanding
of the past function of the business judgment rule. Part V reviews recent
legislation permitting insulation of directors from liability for their own
negligence. This legislation, however, does not protect their decisions
from judicial review.
I. THE ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT:
CONFUSION AND CONTROVERSY
The ALI's corporate governance project began in a period of populist
criticism of American corporations. 10 Observers vehemently disagreed
about whether there was anything fundamentally wrong with America's
system of corporate governance." Indeed, that disagreement extended
to the role of the state in corporate law: was it a regulator or enabler of
contracts? 2 The ALI's approach to such a project would depend upon
the identity of those heading the project, and their views on this question.
After an initial attempt at conservative leadership was ended by an un-
timely death, the project was placed in the hands of reporters viewed by
some as advocates of regulation. 3 This characterization has led to vehe-
ment denials by the current reporter, who claims that the criticisms of
the project are overdrawn. He maintains that the Reporters in fact sup-
port the enabling and contractarian view of the corporation, and seek
only to save the corporation by providing legal rules to ensure the ac-
10. See, eg., R. NADER, M. GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORA-
TION: THE CASE FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS (1976) and R. NA-
DER, M. GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976); Hearings Before the
Comm. on Commerce, on Corporate Rights and Responsibilities, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. (June 15-17, 21-
23 (1976)).
11. See, eg., R. HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE CORPORATION (1979); THE ATrACK ON COR-
PORATE AMERICA (M. JOHNSON ed. 1978).
12. Compare Nader, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION, supra note 10, at 15-17, with Hessen,
supra note 11, passim. The confusion is not limited to treatise writers. Compare Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) ("It is no more a state instru-
ment than a natural person exercising the same powers would be" - Marshall, C.J.) with Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906) ("ITihe corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be
incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises, and
holds them subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited
by law. It can make no contract not authorized by its charter.") (Brown, J.).
13. See text infra at note 58.
[Vol. 66:239
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countability necessary to obtain legitimacy. 14
A. The Background of the Corporate Governance Project
The corporate governance project could be said to have its genesis in
William L. Cary's famous "race to the bottom" article about the develop-
ment of Delaware corporate law.' 5 As the president of the ALI has
stated, during the 1970's corporations were under attack, and when fed-
eral intervention was being proposed, "[t]he importance of assuring a
sturdy institutional framework for our free enterprise system" was appar-
ent to many observers. 16
The history of corporate criticism in the late 1960's and 1970's is well
documented, and need not be repeated here. Anti-war activists used cor-
porate proxy machinery and the courts to lobby for their view of corpo-
rate social responsibility-which included termination of the
manufacture of napalm for the government. 'I Other activists joined with
Ralph Nader in proxy campaigns to make General Motors more socially
responsible. 18
The same critics who were urging "social responsibility" even at the
expense of corporate profits, simultaneously claimed that a series of ma-
jor corporate bankruptcies and fraud cases demonstrated that the current
governance system was not even serving the narrow goal of shareholder
wealth maximization. 19 Some observers believed that corporate directors
were largely at fault, remaining aloof and ignorant about corporate af-
fairs, and passive in responding to management's proposed courses of
action.20 The disclosures of questionable payments during the post-
14. Eisenberg, Modernizing Corporate Law, supra note 4 at 628 and New Modes of Discourse,
supra note 4, at 589-90.
15. Cary, Corporate Law and Federalism: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1973),
is cited by Schwartz, Introduction, in Symposium on Federal and State Roles in Establishing Stan-
dards of Conduct for Corporate Management, 31 Bus. LAW. 859, 863 (1976), which in turn was cited
by Herbert Wechsler, then Director of the ALI, as the conference that persuaded him "that there
were important problems in the field of corporate structure and governance that the Institute could
fruitfully address .. " Wechsler, Forward, in T.D. No. 1, supra note 1, at vii.
16. Perkins, The Genesis and Goals of the ALI Corporate Governance Project, 8 CARDOZO L.
REV. 661, 664 (1987) [hereinafter Genesis]. This article contains a more detailed history of the
background of the ALI, and of the corporate governance project, than is presented here.
17. See Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated
as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
18. See generally Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM,
69 MICH. L. REV. 421 (1971).
19. See generally Seligman, supra note 4, at 329-330.
20. Id. at 330-36.
1988]
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Watergate era were seized upon as evidence that directors were not even
monitoring to make sure that corporations remained law-abiding.21
Cary's attack on Delaware corporate law, and the "race to the bottom,"
with its proposal for federal minimum standards of conduct, was only the
opening volley in a mounting attack.22 Nader's proposals for federal
chartering represented the ultimate flowering of that movement.23 These
proposals called not only for outside directors to monitor managers, but
also for monitoring that would benefit constituencies other than share-
holders--employees, communities and consumers, to name a few. In the
midst of this ferment critics attacked even the provenance of the Model
Business Corporation Act, on the grounds that the membership of the
ABA Committee on Corporate Laws was tilted toward corporate practi-
tioners who represented management.24
These pressures led to an awareness among corporate lawyers of what
appeared to be a widespread-and was most certainly a highly vocal-
discontent with the performance of corporate managers.25 In hindsight,
one might speculate that this discontent was either no more than the
anti-business bias that often exists in many people, or the particular at-
tacks of those-largely academics-with their own agendas, rather than
some wider and more focused concern on the part of the electorate.
These same pressures generated the Airlie House Conference of 1975,
sponsored by the American Bar Association Section of Corporation,
Banking and Business Law. At the Airlie House Conference questions of
corporate legitimacy and control of corporate action were high on the
agenda.26 Federal chartering seemed to be the preferred solution to a
variety of ills described.27
21. Id. at 333-36.
22. Cary, supra note 15.
23. Nader, Green & Seligman, supra note 10.
24. Eisenberg, Book Review, The Model Business Corporation Act and the Model Business Cor-
poration Act Annotated, 29 Bus. LAW. 1407, 1408-10 (1974). Eisenberg argued that three groups
needed to be represented fully: practitioners representing management, practitioners representing
shareholder litigants, and academics. In contrast, in his later role as Reporter for the corporate
governance project, Eisenberg faulted critics of the project, and the critical literature, in part because
"[s]ome of it trades on irrelevant matters of provenance .... " Eisenberg, New Modes of Discourse,
supra note 4, at 608.
25. See generally Garrett, Changing Concepts in Business Ethics, in ABA National Institute,
Advisors to Management: Responsibilities and Liabilities ofLawyers and Accountants, 30 (Special
Issue) Bus. LAW. 7 (Mar. 1975).
26. Symposium on Federal and State Roles in Establishing Standards of Conduct for Corporate
Management, 31 Bus. LAW. 861 (1976).
27. See, e.g., Jennings, Federalization of Corporation Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31 BUS.
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This was the setting for the Committee on Corporate Laws' efforts "to
set forth a standard of care applicable to directors thus changing the pol-
icy of the original draftsmen of the Model act who believed that the stan-
dard of care for directors would more appropriately be found in the
decisions of the courts ... .28 I now believe that the Committee's 1974
proposal, adopted in 1975, was a radical change in corporate law. The
crucial language has been preserved in later versions of the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act. It reads:
All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and
the business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed under the direc-
tion of, a board of directors ....
A director shall perform his duties as a director ... in good faith, in a
manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation,
and with such care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would
use under similar circumstances.29
The Committee on Corporate Laws perhaps thought that the principal
thrust of the revision of section 35 was to relieve directors of legal re-
sponsibility for the day-to-day management of the corporation. 30 Ulti-
mately, however, the language chosen to accomplish this became a tool
for creating a new and active duty to monitor for corporate law
violations.
In 1976 the ABA published the Corporate Director's Guidebook, which
again addressed the question of the duties and liabilities of directors.31
That document expanded on the standards of care set forth in the 1975
amendments to section 35 of the Model Act. It stated that the "reason-
LAW. 991 (1976); Cary, Summary of Article on Federalism and Corporate Law, 31 Bus. LAW. 1105
(1976); and Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31 Bus. LAW. 1125 (1976).
28. Committee on Corporate Laws, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the
American Bar Association, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 29 Bus. LAW. 947, 948
(1974).
29. Committee on Corporate Laws, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the
American Bar Association, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 30 Bus. LAW. 501, 502
(1975) [hereinafter Report of Committee on Corporate Law] (amending section 35 of the Model Busi-
ness Corp. Act).
30. The first sentence of section 35, which formerly read in relevant part: "The business and
affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board of directors .... was amended as described
supra text at note 29. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 28, at 949.
3 1. Subcommittee on Functions and Responsibilities of Directors, of the Committee on Corpo-
rate Laws, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, American Bar Association, CORPO-
RATE DIRECTOR'S GUIDEBOOK, 32 Bus. LAW. 5 (1976). A revised edition was published by the full
Committee on Corporate Laws in 1978, see infra note 99.
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ably believes" language "establishes the objectivity of the standard gov-
erning director conduct .... "
Congressional Hearings held in 1976 and 1977 focused on various pro-
posals to federalize corporate law.33 Senator Metzenbaum's opening re-
marks typified the mood of the hearings. After noting the large size of
many corporations, the Penn Central bankruptcy, the sensitive payments
made abroad, and the fact that some corporations are polluters, 4 he
stated:
The time is ripe for full-scale exploration into what, if anything, the
American people should be doing to make corporations more accountable
to their stockholders and to the public. I am not here to say that all corpo-
rations are bad, because that is not true. Some far-sighted corporations and
corporate lawyers have initiated some modest changes on their own. But
the fact is that there is need for change. The only question left is how it is
to come about.
3 5
At the 1976 Senate Hearings Professor Harvey Goldschmid, later re-
porter for Part IV of the corporate governance project, began his testi-
mony by associating himself with Ralph Nader's view that corporations
were not being adequately regulated under state corporation laws.36 His
proposals for federal regulation included replacement of state laws with
stricter federal fiduciary standards for directors, officers and controlling
shareholders, establishment of governance provisions to assure corporate
adherence to law; and establishment of a governance structure that
would provide an independent board, capable of "checking" senior
managers.3 7
The onslaught continued into the 1980's. Noting widespread doubts
about the effectiveness of the corporate accountability processes, the
SEC, under the chairmanship of Harold Williams, began a "corporate
governance proceeding," with nationwide hearings in 1977 and a final
32. CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S GUIDEBOOK, supra note 31, at 15.
33. See Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Senate Hearings] and The Role of the Share-
holder in the Corporate World: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Citizens and Shareholders Rights
and Remedies of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter 1977
Senate Hearings].
34. A litany often recited by those sympathetic to federal chartering. See, e.g., Seligman, supra
note 4, at 329-336.
35. 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 2.
36. 1976 Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 241.
37. Id.
[Vol. 66:239
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report in 1980.38 Senator Howard Metzenbaum and Congressman Ben-
jamin Rosenthal continued to propose legislation reflecting the agenda
previously described-requirements for outside directors, nominating
and audit committees, and definitions of directors' duties of care and loy-
alty.39 One part of the legislative reform package received approval: the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, with its ominously vague com-
mand to corporate officials to implement monitoring mechanisms ade-
quate to assure that sensitive payments do not go undetected.'
The Business Roundtable joined the debate in 1977 with a symposium,
which produced a summary published in 1978 in The Business Lawyer.41
The report focused on suggestions to improve the effectiveness of corpo-
rate boards, and thus answer concerns about accountability and legiti-
macy.42 Those recommendations were said to reflect present practice,
and to provide "the optimum harmonization of corporate accountability
with the decisiveness and flexibility of management .... 43
The 1975 Airlie House Conference was followed by a series of regional
conferences in 1977-78 that were jointly sponsored by the ABA section,
the ALI, and the ALI-ABA Committee on Continuing Professional Edu-
cation.' These conferences apparently generated no consensus on the
nature of the problems with corporate governance and structure that
Herbert Wechsler, then Director of the ALI, claimed were the impetus
for the corporate governance project.45 This result was hardly surpris-
ing, since a contemporary article by Bayless Manning identified nine dif-
38. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13482 (Apr. 28, 1977) (announcing the corporate
governance proceeding) and SEC, Div. Corp. Fin., STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABIL-
srY, reprinted for the Use of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate
(1980).
39. Protection of Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980, S. 2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), re-
printed in Hearings Before the Subcomn. on Securities of the Comm. on Banking Housing and Ur-
ban Affairs, 96th Cong. 2d Sess., 13-28 (1980) and Corporate Democracy Act of 1980, H.R. 7010,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 360-95 (1980).
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to -2 (1982).
41. The Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large
Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083 (1978) [hereinafter The Role and Composition of
the Board].
42. Id. at 2092-94.
43. Id. at 2094.
44. Wechsler, supra note 15, at vii-viii. For a critique that argues that these conferences failed
to identify any "problems in the field of corporate structure and governance," see West, An Econo-
mist Looks at the ALI Proposals, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 638 (1984).
45. Wechsler, supra note 15; West, supra note 44.
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ferent species of answers to the question, "precisely what is it about
today's corporations or corporation law that seems to you so antisocial,
dangerous, or unjust?"'  Indeed, there were those participants who ar-
gued that corporations were already quite legitimate, and that the ALI
was asking the wrong questions. 7
B. Reform and Change in Corporate Law
In 1978 the Council of the ALI voted to begin a corporate governance
project.4" Roswell Perkins, President of the ALI, described the primary
motivations behind this action as securing public confidence for business
corporations (legitimacy) and clarifying existing law.49 Others have de-
scribed it more dramatically, citing, in addition to the federal chartering
proposals, the "ominous presence of Senator Howard Metzenbaum, Con-
gressman Benjamin Rosenthal, and some benign outside agitators like
Mark Green and Ralph Nader, and others who were suggesting much
more radical proposals." 0 In the words of Donald Schwartz, "if all
those ideas were to be rejected ... then there was a need to strengthen
internal mechanisms within the corporation. And that's why the initial
focus was on corporate governance .... It was not to manage the corpo-
ration, but to increase monitoring. . .. "'
Another account suggests the influence of Professor Louis Loss on the
shape of the project at the initial discussion stage:
It was Professor Loss who suggested what kind of project it should be when
he said that the Project should not be the usual restatement, because so
much of corporate law is not restatable. But there was certainly the possi-
bility of restating substantial parts of corporate law that were essentially
common law in origin; officers' and directors' duties, and the remedies for
enforcing those duties.
By restatement, Loss did not mean just taking the rule that the plurality
of jurisdictions follows. He meant selecting the best and most forward
looking rules, a process which is typical and traditional for an ALI
46. Manning, Thinking Straight About Corporate Law Reform, 41 LAWV & CONTEMP. PROn. 3,
9 (1977).
47. P. Aranson, A Political Economist's Perception: Corporations Are More Legitimate Than
Government, in COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE 81 (D. Schwartz,
ed. 1979) [hereinafter COMMENTARIES].
48. Perkins, Genesis, supra note 16, at 667 (1987).
49. Id. at 667.
50. Schwartz, Genesis Panel Response, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 687, 689 (1987).
51. Id.
[Vol. 66:239
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project. 2
The original goals of the corporate governance project were stated by
Herbert Wechsler in the forward to the First Tentative Draft, which ap-
peared in 1982:
There were strong indications at the conferences [referred to above] of pro-
fessional support for Institute examination of the field, with substantial
preference for an approach that would encompass both restatement and
recommendations for improvement in prevailing law or practice.
When this point had been reached, the Council invited Ray Garrett, Jr.,
... to define a project, if any that he thought the Institute should under-
take. Responding in May, 1978, Mr. Garrett recommended a program con-
sisting, initially, at least of 'a restatement with recommendations regarding
the legal duties incident to corporate management and control.' 9)53
To this date it can be argued that the goals of the project remain un-
clear. 4 While Professor Loss wished for the project to provide the "best
and most forward looking rules," his colleague, Robert Clark, later
viewed the project as doing little more than restating majority rules.5
The ALI's president, Roswell Perkins, on the other hand, viewed it as
designed to "preserve and enhance the effectiveness of corporations," and
to clarify corporate law. 6 Clarification could be characterized as a
stronger specification of the property rights of various actors in the firm.
Such clarification is at odds with the emphasis on greater judicial review
of corporate decisions that seems likely under the ALI's proposals. Pro-
fessor Christopher Stone, a self-described reformer, recently elucidated
the difficulties with a general goal such as "legitimacy": "Talk about
legitimacy, because it is safely abstract and 'high-falutin', only distracts
52. Id. at 688.
53. Wechsler, supra note 15, at viii. Professor Wechsler went on to quote from Mr. Garrett's
explanation of his intentions:
Where there is no judicial authority, or where the cases are unsatisfactory by modem
standards-either because of their antiquity, or the absence of compelling analysis, or be-
cause today they just seem wrong-resort must be had to other sources. These may in-
clude the literature on the subject, the better corporate practice in the view of those
experienced in the field, not limited to lawyers, and ultimately the judgment of the Insti-
tute, aided by the Reporter and his Advisers. Where the project is in not fact restating the
cases, the Institute's views should take the form of recommendations, which may include
recommended statutory provisions, state or federal.
Id.
54. Dooley, Genesis Panel Response, 8 CARnozo L. REv. 695, 696 (1987).
55. Clark, Genesis: Panel Response, 8 CARDOzo L. REv. 691, 692 (1987).
56. Perkins, Genesis, supra note 16, at 667.
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from the real issues. ' 57
Given the lack of consensus about the nature of the project, selection
of reporters was crucial to its ultimate direction. Ray Garrett was se-
lected as the Chief Reporter for the project, but the work had barely
begun when he died in February, 1980.58 After Mr. Garrett's death
those appointed as reporters generally have been identified with the law
reform proposals described above. George Birrell described the reporters
now responsible for the provisions concerning duties and liabilities of di-
rectors in the following terms: 9
Professors Melvin A. Eisenberg (now the Chief Reporter), Harvey J.
Goldschmid, and John C. Coffee, Jr. all had concluded publicly that the
then existing corporate governance system was broken and in need of re-
pair. Professor Eisenberg was a particularly strong proponent of the 'moni-
toring' model for boards of directors and the need for total director
independence from management. 6° Professor Goldschrnid had espoused a
more precise definition of board responsibilities, emphasizing the duty of
checking on management combined with new remedies and penalties to en-
force those duties.61 Professor Coffee had expressed similar views in a
1977 law review article62 and then in 1981 proposed a model act relating to
derivative actions which would facilitate their initiation, make them more
difficult to terminate, and provide greater incentives to plaintiffs' counsel to
maintain the actions.63
The response of the bar and the corporate community to the First Ten-
tative Draft was unprecedented. 64 The Business Roundtable took the un-
usual step of addressing the project. It complained that rather than
57. Stone, Response to Sommer, The Struggle for Corporate Responsibility, 8 CARDOZO L. REV.
832, 833 (1987) [hereinafter Response].
58. Wechsler, supra note 15, at viii-ix.
59. Birrell, Forward, THE AMERICAN LAW INsTrrUTE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE at vii-viii (1987). [Footnotes are taken from the quoted material, but are
renumbered here.]
60. M. EISENBERG, THE STRucTuRE OF THE CORPORATION 168 (1976); Eisenberg, A Larger
Role for Shareholders, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 47, at 133, 136.
61. Goldschmid, The Governance of the Public Corporation. Internal Relationship, in COM-
MENTARIES, supra note 47, at 167, 170, 174-76.
62. Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct
and an Effective Legal Response, 64 VA. L. REv. 1099, 113247 (1977).
63. Coffee and Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for
Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 261, 302-09 (1981).
64. Perkins, Genesis, supra note 16, at 669, described it as having "aroused cries of alarm in the
business world," which he attributed to "insufficient understanding of where the law of business
corporations already stood." He cited H. BALLANTInE, LAW OF CORPORATIONS (rev. ed. 1946) in
support of his claim that the law was already as T.D. No. 1 suggested. Id. at n.22. This article takes
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carefully distinguishing between restatements of existing law and reform
proposals, "[t]he Reporters instead had created a homogeneous docu-
ment, in which all black letter rules ... start with the same phrase, 'cor-
porate law should provide.' "6 Law journal symposia proliferated, and
at one of them Stanley Kaplan, then Chief Reporter, noted that the reac-
tion had been "extraordinary."66 His successor, Professor Melvin Eisen-
berg, found it necessary to engage in the ad hominem tactic of
characterizing the critics of the project as "Manicheans" who divide the
debate over corporate law into two schools-the forces of Light and the
forces of Darkness.6 7 In the Second Tentative Draft, which appeared in
1984, Herbert Wechsler referred to the "fiery rhetoric aroused by Tenta-
tive Draft No. 1 . . "I In response, the title of the document was
changed to "Analysis and Recommendations," and the phrase "corpo-
rate law should provide" was deleted. As Professor Wechsler took pains
to explain, the new format "makes clear, it is believed, that all statements
concerned with law should be regarded as recommendations of the Insti-
tute .... 69 He defended the law reform nature of the project, stating
that "[tihe Restatements, important as they are, never have been viewed
as the exclusive means for the pursuit of our objectives: the clarification
and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social needs." 70
In support of his assertion, he listed numerous projects such as the Uni-
form Commercial Code and other codes that had been undertaken,
largely during his tenure as Director. Professor Wechsler assured read-
ers that there would be no blurring of true restatements and recommen-
dations for law reform, because of "the context and the explanation in
the position that Professor Ballantine erred in his description of the duty of care. See infra text
accompanying notes 144-72.
65. The Business Roundtable, STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE ON THE AMERI-
CAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PROPOSED "PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUC-
TURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS" 3 (1983) [hereinafter "Business Roundtable
Statement"].
66. Kaplan, Misconceptions About the ALI Corporate Governance Project and the Role of Criti-
cism, in Symposium: The ALI's Corporate Governance Proposals: Law and Economics, 9 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 586, 587 (1984). Other symposia include Symposium on Corporate Governance, 8 CAR-
Dozo L. REv. 657 (1987); The American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project: A Sympo-
sium, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 495 (1984) and ALl Corporate Governance Project, 37 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 169 (1983).
67. Eisenberg, New Modes of Discourse, supra note 4, at 587. For a reply, see Baysinger &
Butler, Reply, supra note 4.
68. T.D. No. 2, supra note 1, at ix.
69. Id.
70. Id. at ix-x.
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the Comment making clear how far a recommendation is believed to be
consistent with prevailing law and how far legal change is contemplated
"71
By 1988 the ALI may regard the corporate governance project as
something of a tar baby. In 1985 it was necessary to seek an additional
$500,000 for the project, which was granted by the MacArthur Founda-
tion.72 The ALI's president Perkins noted that the project had proved to
be "far more difficult and far more controversial than anticipated when it
was commenced." 3 Indeed, one of the most difficult areas, involving
transactions in control, has not yet been the subject of a tentative draft,
indicating how far the ALI has yet to travel.74
C. An Overview of the ALI View of the Duties and
Liabilities of the Board
The ALI's proposals concerning the role of corporate directors have
generated the greatest controversy. The role of shareholders, and of the
market for corporate control, have received relatively little attention so
far. This is consistent with a view that directors are the dominant actors
in corporate governance, and are thus far not held effectively accountable
to shareholders or to other constituencies of the corporation.75
Central to the ALI's proposals are rules governing the nature and ex-
tent of the monitoring role of the board of directors. The early drafts
emphasized this with legal requirements concerning the use of outside
directors and monitoring committees, that have since been modified to
become mere recommendations of good corporate practice.76 But the
71. Id.
72. Perkins, The President's Letter, 3 ALI REPORTER 1-7 (April, 1985).
73. Id.
74. Professor Ronald Gilson has been named as co-Reporter along with Marshall Small, for
Part VI, Transactions in Control. At this date a preliminary study of issues involved has been
produced. Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations - Reporters' Study
No. 1 - Transactions in Control, ALI (1985). Various informal drafts of Part VI have been circulated
for review by the ALI Council, but they have not yet been published for a wider audience.
75. Carney, Toward a More Perfect Market for Corporate Control, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 593, 595-
96 (1984) (reviewing T.D. No. I). The somewhat more refined discussion of the function of markets
as controllers of management behavior in T.D. No. 2, supra note 1, at 74-76, is noted.
76. The ALI's current proposal has partially abandoned its earlier requirement that boards of
publicly owned companies should be dominated by so-called "independent" directors. Section 3.03
of T.D. No. 1, supra note 1, required that the boards of large publicly held corporations should be
composed of at least a majority of directors who were "free of any significant relationships with the
corporations's senior executives ..... T.D. No. 2, supra note 1, § 3.04, reduced that to a recommen-
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ALI's vision of the role of the corporate board has not changed. The
Reporters still envision the board as a monitor-as a watchdog to assure
that corporate employees behave lawfully and responsibly.77 That vision,
buttressed by statements of the duty of care of boards that do not corre-
spond with either past or present legal reality, imposes burdens on corpo-
rate boards not previously required by American law.
The ALI suggested a vigorous monitoring role for a board dominated
by directors without any particular stake in the corporation's success.7"
At the same time, the ALI created a paradox by recognizing the need for
modem boards to delegate many of their functions to hired managers-
the very persons the board is expected to monitor.7 9 No attempt is made
to explain how an outside board, unfamiliar as it must be with the inter-
nal working details of a large corporation, can expect the very employees
it must monitor to assist it in the monitoring function.
The duty of care imposed by the ALI, that of an ordinarily prudent
person in like circumstances, is consistent with other recent formulations
of the rule. However, the recent formulations, with their aspirational
language, a product of the 1970's, come in conflict with the holdings of
virtually all the decided cases.
The ALI's formulation of the business judgment rule does not capture
the deference generally granted to directors. This deference is best evi-
denced by the almost total absence of decisions holding directors liable
for breaches of the duty of care in connection with affirmative decisions
(as opposed to total inattention and neglect). As the most prominent
scholarly work in the field has suggested, it may be more accurate to
state the rule as one of gross negligence."0 The ALI's approach merges
dation of corporate practice, which was continued in the reorganization of those provisions in T.D.
No. 4, supra note 1, p. xvii ("Note on Proposed Revisions in Part III of Tentative Draft No. 2").
77. T.D. No. 2, supra note 1, § 3.02(a)(1), provides that it is the function of the board to "over-
see the conduct of the corporation's business with a view to evaluating, on an ongoing basis, whether
the corporation's resources are being managed in a manner consistent with the principles of § 2.01
.... " T.D. No. 2, supra note 1, § 2.01(a), unlike any statement of the objectives of a corporation
currently found in U.S. statutes, provides that a business corporation "is obliged, to the same extent
as a natural person, to act within the boundaries set by law." The most recent formulation of the
duty of care to monitor for law compliance is found in T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01.
78. See supra note 76.
79. The power of boards to delegate is set out in T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, §§ 4.01(b) and 4.02 -
4.03, discussed infra text at notes 124-26.
80. Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in Indemnification of Corporate Direc-
tors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1101 (1968) ("All in all, I remain very skeptical of the proposi-
tion that directors of industrial corporations run any substantial risk of liability for ordinary
negligence.")
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the business judgment rule into the stricter and more aspirational state-
ments of the duty of care, by making compliance with the duty a prereq-
uisite to the shelter of the rule. Where the board must make affirmative
decisions, the ALI would provide the shield of the business judgment
rule only where the courts had scrutinized, after the fact, whether the
director had assembled sufficient information on which to make a deci-
sion.- Sufficient information means, in the words of the ALI, when "he
reasonably believes" that he is sufficiently informed to the extent appro-
priate under the circumstances."1 This approach admits only in the most
extreme cases that the process of deciding how much information is re-
quired for a decision is itself a business judgment, entitled to the protec-
tion of the rule.
Finally, under the ALI's approach, the validity of the decision itself is
tested under a "rational basis" test that departs from the more liberal
formulations generally used by the courts.8 2 In short, both the process of
making a decision and the decision itself will be subject to review after
the fact, contrary to past judicial practice. In the words of the ABA, it
provides an objective test of the directors' decisions.8 3 The mischief pos-
sible in such an approach is already being demonstrated in the courts.
8 4
D. The Consequences of the ALI's Proposals
Hints of judicial acceptance of the changes suggested by the ALI, cou-
pled with other forces, have disrupted corporate practices. Increases in
liability insurance premiums for officers and directors have created a fu-
ror. In some cases the unavailability of insurance has led to widespread
resignations of outside directors. In the ultimate irony, these factors
have led to widespread legislative action, rejecting the very rules of liabil-
ity the ALI Reporters have urged. As a result, the ALI standards appear
irrelevant even before their final adoption.
81. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(c)(2).
82. Section 4.01(c)(3) of T.D. No. 4 phrases the test in terms of whether the director "rationally
believes" the business judgment is in the best interests of the corporation, while T.D. No. 1 and T.D.
No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(d)(3) phrased it in terms of whether the director had a "rational basis"
for such beliefs. For convenience I shall refer to this as the "rational basis" test, regardless of the
draft being discussed.
83. Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 31, at 15.
84. See infra part III.D.
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II. THE MONITORING ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Here, as in the following two sections, I examine the ALI's claims
about the state of existing law in light of the statutes and cases cited by
the Reporters. Proving the negative of a proposition remains an impossi-
ble task, so I only argue that if the Reporters were unable to find any
authority to support their claims, it is highly improbable that any such
authority exists. If proponents of a statement of the law must bear the
burden of proof, the Reporters have clearly failed in their task.
A. The Monitoring Function-A New Role?
1. The ALI's Approach
The requirement that directors monitor corporate officials for law
compliance is one of the major reforms introduced by the ALI project.8 5
Section 3.02 provides that the board must oversee corporate conduct
with a view to evaluating, "on an ongoing basis, whether the corpora-
tion's resources are being managed in a manner consistent with the prin-
ciples of section 2.01", which includes the obligation to "act within the
boundaries set by law."8 6 Further, as section 4.01(a)(1) points out,
"[t]his duty includes the obligation to make... such inquiry as the direc-
tor or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circum-
stances."' 7 The official comments cite no law for this obligation, but
instead cite only the aspirational language of the ABA's Corporate Direc-
tor's Guidebook. The Guidebook states that "the corporate director
should be concerned that the corporation has programs looking toward
compliance with applicable laws and regulations ... and that it main-
tains procedures for monitoring such compliance."88 Rather than iden-
tify this as a law reform proposal, the official comment begins by
conceding that it differs from the statutory formulations of the board's
role, "but [it] provides an articulation of basic functions and powers
which almost certainly would be arrived at by the courts in light of the
language of these statutes, read in the context of modem corporate prac-
85. This does not ignore the requirements of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, supra
note 40. That act requires monitoring only in the limited are of certain payments to foreign officials,
rather than more general monitoring for compliance with all laws.
86. T.D. No. 2, supra note 1, § 3.02(a)(2).
87. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(aXl).
88. T.D. No. 2, supra note 1, § 3.02 comment d, at 69. Veasey, New Insights Into Judicial
Deference to Directors' Business Decisions: Should We Trust the Courts?, 39 Bus. LAW 1461, 1465
(1984), also characterizes these statements as aspirational.
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tice."' 9 Ironically, the statutes cited are those, such as the Model Act
and Delaware, that were amended to excuse directors from direct man-
agement, rather than to impose a monitoring duty on them.90
This language "requires a director or officer to use reasonable care
with respect to his corporation's obligation to obey the law." 91 The cases
cited in support of the monitoring obligations of directors under section
4.01(a) provide no support for a monitoring obligation. Instead the cases
support only a rule that directors may not participate in corporate activi-
ties that violate the law-in short, that they may not be active partici-
pants in law violations.92 The more controversial proposition is that of
section 4.01(a)(1), which imposes a duty of reasonable inquiry to assure
that law violations do not occur. The official comments indicate that
"the 'inquiry' concept set forth in section 4.01(a)(1) is generally recog-
nized in the case law and by commentators. ' 93 It is revealing that the
reporters cite no cases at this point.
Turning to examples of "reasonable inquiry in appropriate circum-
stances", the official comments attempt to give examples of the duty to
monitor. The comments assert that "[t]he board's oversight and reason-
able inquiry obligations should be interpreted to include an affirmative
obligation of directors to be reasonably concerned with the existence and
effectiveness of programs or procedures to assist the board in overseeing
the corporation's business."' 94 And later: "the affirmative establishment
and maintenance of law compliance programs is widely accepted busi-
ness practice today."9
The only case cited on the duty to monitor for law compliance is di-
rectly contrary to the assertions concerning existing law. In Graham v.
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., the Delaware Supreme Court, in the
words of the Reporters, "seemed to envision a passive role for the board,
at least with respect to one kind of oversight program, a law compliance
89. T.D. No. 2, supra note 1, § 3.02, comment a, at 67.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 121-22.
91. T.D. No. 3, supra note 1, § 4.01(a), comment, at 19-20.
92. Id. at 19-22, citing Abrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y. 52, 55-56, 74 N.E.2d 305, 306 (1947); Wil-
shire Oil Co. v. Riffle, 409 F.2d 1277, 1283-86 (10th Cir. 1969); Di Tomasso v. Loverro, 250 A.D.
206, 209, 293 N.Y.S. 912, 916-17, aff'd mem., 276 N.Y. 551, 12 N.E.2d 570 (1937) and Miller v.
AT&T, 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
93. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(a)(1) - (a)(2), comment c at 43; see also T.D. No. 3, supra
note 1, § 4.01(b), comment, at 42 ("the law is settled with respect to the 'reasonable inquiry'
obligation.")
94. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, at 47.
95. Id. at 49.
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program. '9 6 The notes quote the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion to
the effect that there is "no duty upon the directors to install and operate
a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they
have no reason to suspect exists ....
In rejecting the reasoning of the Allis-Chalmers opinion, the comments
of the Reporters note that the opinion is over twenty years old, and that
the obligation component of the duty of care "is a flexible and dynamic
concept." 9' No cases are cited to demonstrate a contrary rule. The com-
ments cite only the aspirational language of the Corporate Director's
Guidebook, an article by one of the reporters and one other article.99
Does this mean that the law has somehow changed without further deci-
sions, or that the Allis-Chalmers case was an aberration when decided,
being from a state engaged in a "race to the bottom"?"co A close exami-
nation will show that the Allis-Chalmers case was good law at the time of
the decision, and remains so today.
2. The Pre-Allis-Chalmers Law
Prior law on the duty to monitor for law compliance supports the Al-
lis-Chalmers rule. It is based on the not unreasonable assumption that
directors are busy people who must, of necessity in large enterprises, rely
96. Id. at 47-48 (citing Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125
(1963)).
97. Id. at 48 (quoting 41 Del. Ch. at 85-86, 188 A.2d at 130-31).
98. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, at 48.
99. Id. at 48-49, (citing American Bar Association, Section of Corporation, Banking and Busi-
ness Law, Committee on Corporate Laws, The Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591
(1978) [hereinafter The Corporate Director's Guidebook]); The Role and Composition of the Board,
supra note 41; Small, The Evolving Role of the Director in Corporate Governance, 30 HASTINGS L.J.
1353, 1360-61, n.35 (1979) and Veasey & Manning, Codified Standard--Safe Harbor or Uncharted
Reef?, 35 Bus. LAW. 919, 930 (1980). The comments concede that "[tihe Corporate Director's
Guidebook and the Business Roundtable Statement [The Role and Composition of the Board, supra
note 41] were intended as corporate practice recommendations rather than as rules of law." T.D.
No. 4, supra note 1, at 49. The article by Small makes no claims about a legally imposed duty to
monitor for law violations; it only addresses the obligations of directors where wrong-doing has been
called to their attention. The article by Veasey & Manning notes the The Role and Composition of
the Board, supra note 41, and states that "If this statement tells us about what an 'ordinarily prudent
person... in a like position... under similar circumstaneds' would do by suggesting that directors
of large corporations are expected to install... compliance systems," then hypothetical directors
facing a situation similar to that of directors in the Allis Chalmers case "may well be liable for their
failure to do so." 35 Bus. LAW. at 930. The authors do not assert, however, that the The Role and
Composition of the Board is indeed a statement of fact about current practices.
100. A phrase popularized by the late Professor William L. Cary of Columbia in his famous
article, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 705 (1974).
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on the honesty and integrity of the agents chosen to run the business, at
least until facts are called to their attention that require further investiga-
tion. In short, no monitoring duty existed prior to Allis-Chalmers. Only
one case appears to be directly on point, and it, too, involved antitrust
violations. District Judge Wyzanski instructed a jury that officers of cor-
porations who take no part in a violation are not liable for it.101
Other cases addressing questions of monitoring involved not corporate
criminal acts, but criminal acts by corporate employees, such as theft
from the corporation. While not directly on point, they illustrate the
settled judicial view of the duties of directors, and directors' entitlement
to assume honesty on the part of corporate employees.
American law on the monitoring duties of the board began with Briggs
v. Spaulding, in which directors were sued in connection with a bank
failure caused by employee thefts."°2 Nearly all of the assets of the bank
were stolen by the time of discovery in a type of fraud that was novel for
the time. In holding that the non-officer directors were not liable, Chief
Justice Fuller quoted with approval from Spering's Appeal, which held
that directors have no duty to monitor. 10 3
The opinion also quoted English authority for the proposition that no
monitoring duties were imposed on directors."° It then refused to im-
pute knowledge of all corporate records to the directors, noting that ,di-
101. [Ihf an individual who was an officer of a corporation has no connection with the action
of the corporation on a particular matter except he happens to be an officer, he is not
personally liable under this statute or in this complaint. To be liable an individual must
either himself participate or must authorize another to act or must with knowledge of the
responsibility acquiesce in the act of another with which he is affiliated as an officer or in a
like relationship.
Wyzanski, J., charge to the jury in Cape Cod Food Products, Inc. v. National Cranberry Ass'n, 119
F. Supp. 900, 919 (D. Mass. 1954).
102. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891).
103. Upon a close examination of all the reported cases, although there are many dicta not
easily reconcilable, yet I have found no judgment or decree which has held directors to
account, except when they have themselves been personally guilty of some fraud on the
corporation, or have known and connived at some fraud in others, or where such fraud
might have been prevented had they given ordinary attention to their duties.
141 U.S. at 148-49 (citing Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11 (1872)).
104. 'I know of no law,' said Vice-Chancellor McCoun, in Scott v. Depeyster, 1 Edw. Ch.
541, 6 L. ed. 239, 'which requires the president or directors of any moneyed institution to
adopt a system of espionage in relation to their secretary or cashier or any subordinate
agent, or to set a watch upon all their actions. While engaged in the performance of the
general duties of their station, they must be supposed to act honestly until the contrary
appears; and the law does not require their employers to entertain jealousies and suspicions
without some apparent reason.'
141 U.S. at 162.
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rectors must trust the affairs of the corporation to corporate officers and
"agents in whom they have confidence, and [must] largely trust to
them."'o 5
This rule continued at least until the decision in Graham v. Allis-Chal-
mers. The treatises of the time clearly state the same rule. Professor
Hornstein stated the rule in 1959:
[A director] is expected to delegate responsibilities to officers (and
agents), and he is not an insurer of their fidelity; but he does become
chargeable with ensuing losses which result either from lack of care in the
appointment or from failure of supervision (e.g., suspicious circumstances
which would have caused an ordinary business man to take action.) 06
A special set of cases involving bank directors suggests that some mon-
itoring duty exists at least where a reasonably attentive director would
have been placed on notice that something was wrong.10 7 But at the time
of the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Allis-Chalmers it clearly
represented the prevailing (indeed universal) rule: directors owe no duty
to monitor for law compliance, absent particular notice of wrong-doing.
3. The Post-Allis-Chalmers Law
The ALI approach appears to depend not on reported judicial deci-
sions, but upon assertions concerning changing management practices.
If standards of conduct are to be tied to those observed by ordinarily
prudent persons in like positions and in similar circumstances, has the
legal duty changed because of changing corporate practices? Under
these circumstances "good corporate practice" becomes the norm, not
only the conduct rule but also the decision rule. In order to provide legal
advice, corporate counsel will need to inform themselves not only about
judicial decisions, but also about the practices of boards of directors
throughout the nation. In support of their assertion about changing
practices, the Reporters cited only the Corporate Directors' Guidebook
and the Business Roundtable's summary of its symposium on The Role
105. Id. at 163.
106. G. Hornstein, 1 CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE 446, 566 (1959). See also N. LATTIN,
LATIN ON CORPORATIONS 247 (1950):
In supervising the business, directors may rely upon reports of their officers as to the
progress being made by their corporation, its financial condition, its probable earnings and
a host of other things upon which tabs should be kept but about which no director would
be expected to do the leg-work.
107. Lattin, supra note 106, at 247-48. See also the Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note
99, at 11, ("there are special statutory standards of responsibility and liability applicable to the
banking director").
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and Composition of the Board. The Reporters claimed that "they reflect
the fact that the affirmative establishment and maintenance of law com-
pliance programs is widely accepted business practice today."'' 0 8 This
assertion ignores the fact that both documents were aspirational and not
empirical, and both were written at a time of attack on the corporation,
which influenced their content.109 As Professor Kenneth Andrews later
complained, the Reporters were either ignorant of the wealth of litera-
ture about the actual functioning of boards, or they ignored it. 10 The
evidence (consisting of the lack of judicial decisions that cite widespread
monitoring practices by prudent directors, and the SEC's difficulties in
rule-making to implement the limited monitoring duties imposed by the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) strongly suggests that corporate prac-
tices may have changed little since Allis-Chalmers, despite exhortations
by the groups mentioned above.
There are no judicial decisions since 1963 that question, criticize or
deviate from the rule so firmly established by the time of the Allis-Chal-
mers decision. In a variety of settings the Delaware courts have reaf-
firmed the basic rule of Allis-Chalmers-that directors are entitled to rely
on the reports and good faith of officers and agents of the company-
even in the context of charges of illegal corporate lobbying payments."1
The courts of other jurisdictions have also cited Allis Chalmers with
approval." 2 Perhaps the most impressive support for the rationale of
Allis-Chalmers comes from a decision refusing to hold directors liable
under the federal securities laws for the fraud of corporate officers. In
Lanza v. Drexel, investors attempted to hold directors liable for their
failure to discover that certain officers of the company had falsified its
financial records by overstating sales, backlogs and profits-a criminal
108. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, at 49.
109. See, eg., The Role and Composition of the Board, supra note 41, at 2101:
Some recent lapses in corporate behavior have emphasized the need for policies and imple-
menting procedure on corporate law compliance. These policies and procedures should be
designed to promote such compliance on a sustained and systematic basis by all levels of
operating management.
110. Andrews, From the Boardroom: Rigid Rules Will Not Make Good Boards, 60, No. 6 HARV.
Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1982, at 34, 37.
111. Kelly v. Bell, 254 A.2d 62, 72 (Del. Ch. 1969) (charges of illegal payments to government);
Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 556 (Del. 1964) (greemnail); cf., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
858, 875 (Del. 1985) (sale of business).
112. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 896 (2d Cir. 1982); Dotlich v. Dotlich, 475 N.E.2d 331, 343
(Ind. App. 1985); Speer v. Dighton Grain, Inc. 624 P.2d 952, 961 (Kan. 1981); Sutton v. Reagan &
Gee, 405 S.W.2d 828, 835 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
[Vol. 66:239
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss2/3
COPORATE GOVERNANCE-SECTION 4.01
act." 3 In a scholarly opinion, Circuit Judge Moore held that an outside
director and a partner in the underwriting firm was not liable for his
failure to monitor and detect the frauds. No requirement existed at com-
mon law that directors monitor for fraud at the time of the adoption of
the Securities Exchange Act, either in England or the United States. The
English rationale, expressed in a suit against bank directors, was the
same as the American, according to the opinion:
I cannot think that it can be expected of a director that he should be
watching either the inferior officers of the bank or verifying the calculations
of the auditors himself. The business of life could not go on if people could
not trust those who are put into a position of trust for the express purpose
of attending to details of management.1 14
The opinion also quoted with approval Judge Learned Hand's
landmark opinion in Barnes v. Andrews, where an outside director was
exonerated from responsibility for the fraud of corporate employees in a
securities offering. Judge Hand wrote that the director "might assume
that those who prepared [the offering documents] would not make them
fraudulent."115
This remains the federal rule under the securities laws to this day-
that directors are not liable for a negligent failure to supervise and moni-
tor for fraud, but only for their own intentional or reckless acts in con-
nection with an offering.' 16
Where it appears appropriate to impose a duty to monitor corporate
employees more carefully, special statutes have generally been adopted.
In the special circumstances of a registration statement section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933 explicitly imposes a duty of due diligence upon
each director to ascertain that the prospectus contains no fraudulent mis-
statements or omissions. 7
Similarly, when foreign payments by corporations appeared to create
problems in international relations, it was necessary for federal law to
require a monitoring duty. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act now ex-
pressly requires corporations to "devise and maintain a system of inter-
nal accounting controls" sufficient to monitor for compliance with the
113. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc).
114. 479 F.2d at 1292 (quoting Dovey v. Cory, [1901] A.C. 477, 485-86).
115. 479 F.2d at 1292 (quoting Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F.2d 614, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1924)).
116. Cf Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
117. Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982).
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board's authorizations. 118 Without that requirement, it is clear that no
express duty exists to monitor for ilegal acts of employees. Even with
that statute, the cases to date generally have involved outrageous illegal
acts that have been brought to the attention of the board, and in which
some directors were active participants, rather than simple failures to
monitor."1 9
In sum, the law has consistently held that directors are entitled to rely
upon corporate officers who they appoint, both for their honesty and
competence, until the directors have reason to believe that the officers are
no longer behaving honestly or competently. This rule was considered
fully justified in a simpler era; as business has grown in size and complex-
ity the justification has become even stronger. To impose a greater moni-
toring duty on directors for law compliance seems to extend the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act to compliance with all laws-a drastic step for
American law.
Even prominent critics of the American Corporation such as Christo-
pher Stone have declined to impose liability on top corporate officials for
corporate crimes. Stone concedes that most top level officials "are not
likely to be familiar enough with wrongful corporate activities to be
tainted with the mental states and actions that, combined, comprise the
elements of various crimes."1 20
B. The Paradox of the Delegating Board
Rather than imposing stricter duties of personal knowledge and super-
vision on directors, the modem trend has been to expand the permissible
reliance of directors on others. The American Bar Association reflected
this trend in its 1974 changes in the Model Business Corporation Act.
To recognize that directors of large publicly held corporations often re-
move themselves from direct management, section 35 of the Model Act
118. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)
(1977)).
119. SEC v. Katy Industries, Inc., 469 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA), A-1 (D. I1. 1978) (charging
director actively agreed to illegal payments); SEC v. International Systems and Control Corp., [1979
Decisions] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) para. 97,207 (D.D.C. 1979) (complaint charged failure to
disclose that corporation spent over $1 million on the Irish estate of a director) and SEC v. Page
Airways, Inc., [1978 Decisions] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) para. 96,393 (D.D.C. 1979) (complaint
charged six officers and directors with making corrupt payments to foreign officials).
120. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS, 60 (1975). But see Stone, Response, supra note 57, at 836
(criticizing state laws that permit executives to be indemnified for fines paid for law violations so
long as the executive had no reason to believe that the conduct was unlawful).
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was amended to place the exercise of management powers "under the
direction" of the board, rather than "by" the board.12 1 Section 35 was
also amended to provide not only an explicit statement of the standard of
care of directors, but also protection for directors who reasonably rely on
information, opinions, reports and statements of others. The list of those
on whom directors can rely is extensive-officers, employees, outside ex-
perts, including counsel and accountants, and committees of the
board. 122 In explaining the expansion of the right of reliance beyond the
previously authorized area of dividend declarations, the ABA Committee
on Corporate Laws stated:
In view of the persistent increase over the years in the complexity of
corporate affairs, and hence in the number and complexity of the matters
which directors must consider, retention of any limitation upon the right of
reliance to specified categories of director actions is felt no longer
warranted. 1 23
That trend has been recognized in the ALI project. The duty of care
and monitoring standards of section 4.01 are qualified by the board's
right to delegate, set out in section 4.01(b).1 2 4 However, instead of recog-
nizing the right to delegate in good faith, the ALI's commentary turns it
on its head, and creates a duty to monitor. The official comments to
section 3.01 include a brief reference to the provisions of section 35 of the
Model Act, which call for exercise of corporate powers "by or under the
authority of.. ." and management of the business "under the direction of
." the board. This is followed by a quick move to the aspirational
statements of the Corporate Director's Guidebook and the Business
Roundtable statement, concerning the monitoring functions that boards
can perform in the absence of direct involvement in the business.1 2 5
What the project fails to recognize is that the cases supporting the right
of boards to delegate and to rely on their employees are precisely the
cases that excuse ignorance of directors with respect to corporate wrong-
doing.126 Permission to delegate thus becomes a duty to monitor, in the
121. American Bar Association, MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED, § 35, 1
(1977 Supp.), as reported in Report of Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 29, at 502. This has
been preserved in REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, § 8.01(b) (1984).
122. Report of Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 29, at 502. This has been preserved in
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, § 8.30(b) (1984).
123. Report of Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 29, at 504.
124. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(b).
125. T.D. No. 2, supra note 1, § 3.01, Comment, at 61-62.
126. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.02 Reporter's Note 2, at 85.
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ALI's view.
The conflict between the extent of delegation necessary for a board of
outside directors to function in a large and complex business enterprise
and the duty to monitor suggested by the ALI is best exemplified by the
difficulties the Securities and Exchange Commission faced in enforcing
the monitoring duty imposed by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.12 7
At one time the SEC proposed rule-making to specify the nature of the
monitoring duties. z12  The SEC abandoned that attempt in favor of a
case-by case ex post attempt to determine what amount of monitoring,
and what kind of monitoring systems, can be reasonably expected of
modem corporations.129 Thus far the results have not been encourag-
ing. 30 Despite this, ALI president Perkins maintains that recognition of
the boards' inability actively to supervise senior executives coupled with
imposition of a monitoring duty has "materially advanced clarity of anal-
ysis" and has left directors "better off in the long run .... ,,131
III. THE DUTY OF CARE
This section examines the conduct rules governing directors' duty of
care. The conduct rule has always been general and open-textured in the
extreme. Indeed, it possesses elements of circularity by referring to stan-
dards of care observed by ordinarily prudent persons in like positions
under similar circumstances. The behavioral standard was thus a mov-
ing target, and directors were informed by observing the conduct of their
colleagues. Because this conduct covered a range'from passive review to
active management, the rule informed directors that a wide range of be-
havior was legally permissible. Presumably they were influenced primar-
127. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)
(1977)).
128. SEC, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15772 (April 30, 1979), [1979 Decisions] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) para. 82,063 (proposing management disclosure of its opinion whether internal
accounting controls provide reasonable assurance that specified objectives were met and describing
any material weaknesses of such controls communicated by independent accountants to
management).
129. SEC, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16877 (June 6, 1980), 557 Sac. REG. & L. REP
(BNA), H-I (withdrawing rules proposed in Release No. 15772, supra note 128, and noting objec-
tions that rules were not designed to provide useful information to investors but to provide a basis
for SEC enforcement actions under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
130. SEC actions in cases cited supra note 119 add little to management's understanding of what
are appropriate monitoring techniques, since they involve fairly egregious offenses where it was clear
that some directors were active participants in major scandals.
131. Perkins, Genesis, supra note 16, at 674-75.
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ily by the behavior of their peers on the board or boards on which they
personally sat.
The outlines of the conduct rule were blurred by directors' knowledge
of the decision rule. Dicta (expressing the conduct rule) and holdings
(reflecting the decision rule) diverged in the courts, and commentators
disagreed about the rule of liability (the decision rule)-whether it was
one of ordinary negligence or gross negligence. An examination of the
holdings strongly suggests that the conduct rule has always been deliber-
ately vague and open, but has been informed by a decision rule of gross
negligence. In this respect a dissonance has always existed between con-
duct and decision rules, which may well be at the root of the current
debate. 132
This part argues that the ALI's statement of the conduct rule has
never born a meaningful relationship to the decision rule applied in the
courts, except in a limited group of cases involving financial institutions.
The principal purpose of this part is only to illustrate the tension between
the rules, and the confusion caused by the inability of well-informed ob-
servers to keep them separate.
A. The ALl Formulation
Section 4.01 of the ALI project attempts first to restate the duty of
care imposed on directors. Phillips characterized this as "black letter"
law, drawn from treatises, indeed, one might say from hornbooks.133 In
one sense there is nothing new in such a restatement-the law has always
imposed some duty of care on directors, and it has always been necessary
to provide a general formulation. The formulation of section 4.01(a)
contains language reminiscent of many cases-that a director must
perform
his functions: in good faith, in a manner that he reasonably believes to be in
the best interests of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily
prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position
and under similar circumstances. 3
132. Phillips, Principles of Corporate Governance: A Critique of Part IV, 52 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 653, 667 (1984), discusses the role of dissonance between conduct rules and decision rules, and
argues that such dissonance is only appropriate when actors are largely unaware of the decision rule.
Id. at 667, text accompanying n.65. Corporate directors, as he notes, are fully advised, and thus
aware of the applicable decision rules.
133. Id. at 657-58. The characterization as "hornbook" law is mine.
134. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(a).
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This language is consistent with the modem trend to formulate the
standard in statutes, as in the Model Business Corporation Act. 135 The
standard is further developed with an obligation to make "such inquiry
as the director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under the
circumstances." 136 This expands the specification of the duties added by
the ABA. 137  Nevertheless, the official comments claim that section
4.01(a) simply restates existing law. 131 The language of section 4.01(a) is
indeed consistent with the formulation of the rule in many judicial deci-
sions. Only the extension of the duty to make a reasonable inquiry repre-
sents a substantive addition to the general duty. The reporters consider
the operative language of the conduct rule to be "care that an ordinarily
prudent person would.., exercise." They further state that this formu-
lation is supported by cases from eleven states, which the reporters claim
have "unambiguously adopted a reasonable care standard." '139 Although
these cases do state that the standard is one of reasonable care, and thus
confirm in part the conduct rule, none address the particular elaboration
of the conduct rule represented by the ALI's statement. Those cases all
involve either banks and other financial institutions or the exoneration of
defendant directors.1" It is well settled that directors of financial institu-
135. See, eg., ABA REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 8.30(b) (1984) ("A director shall
discharge his duties... (1) in good faith; (2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in like
position would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) in a manner he reasonably believes to
be in the best interests of the corporation." See also ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN., 35, 2
(1977 Supp.).
136. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(a)(1).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 28-32.
138. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, at 8-9.
139. Id. at 40.
140. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, n.15 at 39-40 (citing Johnson v. Coleman, 179 Ark. 1087, 1094, 20
S.W.2d 186, 188 (1929) (suit against directors of mortgage company); Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d
1196 (5th Cir. 1982) (suit against insurance company director); Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341
F. Supp. 240, 246 (D. Neb. 1972), aff'd, 473 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1973) (defendants held not liable);
Heit v. Bixby, 276 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mo. 1967) (suit against directors of insurance companies);
Dykema v. Muskegon Piston Ring Co., 348 Mich. 129, 136, 82 N.W.2d 467, 471 (1957) (defendants
not held liable); Boyd v. Applewhite, 121 Miss. 879, 897, 84 So. 16, 23 (1920) (suit against bank
directors); Caldwell v. Eubanks, 326 Mo. 185, 30 S.W.2d 976 (1930) (suit against bank directors);
Department of Banking v. Colburn, 188 Neb. 500, 198 N.W.2d 69 (1972) (suit against bank direc-
tor); Charleston Boot & Shoe Co. v. Dunsmore, 60 N.H. 85 (1880) (directors held not liable); Fran-
cis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (suit against director of
reinsurance brokerage firm); Jensen v. Republic Steel Corp., 32 Ohio L. Abs. 29, 36 (Comm. P1.
1940) (judgment for defendants); Goffv. Emde, 32 Ohio App. 216, 221, 167 N.E. 699, 700 (Ct. App.
1928) (suit against directors of a discount company); Devlin v. Moore, 64 Ore. 433, 130 P. 35 (1913)
(suit against bank directors); FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332, 1334
(Utah 1979) (suit against insurance company director).
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tions are special cases, and that the more intrusive reasonable care stan-
dard (as a decision rule) applies only in these special situations. 4'
Indeed, at one point the reporters' note (but not the official comments)
concedes this, but rejects the distinction, on the specious basis that indus-
trial corporations are often, at least in part, financial institutions. 42
These comments ignore the rationale for the special treatment of banks
and other financial institutions. These institutions are fiduciaries, hold-
ing funds of depositors and others in similar relationships.'43 Thus, the
reporters have generalized from a small set of cases in an inappropriate
manner.
B. Historic Tensions Between Conduct and Decision Rules
The Reporters are not alone in the error I attribute to them: Ballan-
tine has preceded them, citing only bank cases in support of his statement
of the duty of care.'" Indeed, the following discussion is designed to
illustrate that confusion. Like the ALI Reporters, Ballantine discussed
other standards of care for directors, such as gross negligence and the
New York standard of an ordinarily prudent man in the management of
his own affairs. But Ballantine came to the conclusion that "[t]his con-
flict of standards, however, is more apparent than real because in practi-
cal applications such vague abstractions are meaningless, and the judge
and the jury necessarily formulate their owg measuring rods for them-
selves according to their own standards."' 45 In short, Ballantine con-
ceded that aspirational statements of conduct rules have little to do with
the decision rules applied by the courts.
Among other authorities, the ALI draft cites Fletcher's treatise in sup-
141. See, eg., W. CARY and M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS at 523
(5th unabr. ed. 1980); W. FLETCHER, 3A CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 1035, at 28 (perm ed.
1975). Some believe that the characterization of banks and financial institutions as a special category
for duty of care cases is unjustified. See H. BALLANTINE, supra note 64, § 63a. But see Francis v.
United Jersey Bank, supra note 140, justifying the higher standard of care on the basis that these
corporations hold funds of others in a fiduciary capacity.
142. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, at 42-43 n.4.
143. See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d at 824.
144. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 64, at 159 n.11 (rev. ed. 1946), citing Atherton v. Anderson, 99
F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1938) (receiver of bank sued administrator of estate of former bank director);
Lippitt v. Ashley, 89 Conn. 451, 94 A. 995 (1915) (receivers of savings bank brought suit against
directors); Medford Trust Co. v. McKnight, 292 Mass. 1, 197 N.E. 649, 655 (1935) (suit by bank
against 25 past and present directors); Campbell v. Watson, 62 N.J.Eq. 396, 52 A. 120, 126, 134
(1901) (suit by bank receiver against directors) and Anderson v. Bundy, 161 Va. 1, 171 S.E. 501, 507
(1933) (suit against bank directors).
145. BALLANTINE, supra note 64, at 159.
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port of its formulation.146 Fletcher, like Ballantine, recognizes the disso-
nance between the dicta (the conduct rule) and the holdings (the decision
rule) and indicates that the articulated standard is not in fact the applied
standard:
In determining whether directors are liable for negligent mismanagement,
the courts have been prone to use fine sounding phrases in defining the
duties of directors, and then proceed to decide the case without reference
thereto-the rules laid down being such glittering generalities that the case
could be decided either way without violating the rules. For this reason it
is almost impossible to say that there is any considerable conflict of opinion.
All that can be said is that (1) the rule is stated more explicitly and as
imposing greater duties to some extent in some cases than in others, and
that (2) in the final analysis each case is determined upon the particular
facts appearing in the case at bar. 147
Fletcher, like Ballantine, does state that "[iun most jurisdictions ordi-
nary or reasonable care and diligence is the test...,,148 But again, all of
the cases cited involve the special cases of banks and'financial
institutions. 149
Lattin's statement of the duty of care is also cited as consistent with
the ALI's formulation, but is subject to the same criticism, that all of the
cases cited involve banks and financial institutions.150 Lattin does state
that some courts have declared that directors are only liable for gross
negligence, although he believes this standard is too low. 151 More re-
cently, an authoritative article comparing Delaware law with the Model
Act waffled on the state of the law in Delaware. 52
In support of their ordinary negligence standard, the Reporters also
146. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, at 30 n.2.
147. W. FLETCHER, 3A CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS 1029 at 14 (perm. ed. 1975).
148. Id. 1035, at 33.
149. Id. 1035, at 34, n.1. (citing Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961)
(action by corporation against officers and directors of an investment company); First National Bank
of Lincolnwood v. Keller, 318 F. Supp. 339 (N.D. IM. 1970) (action by bank against directors); Hi-
Pro Fish Products, Inc. v. McClure, 224 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Ark, 1963) (action by creditors of bank
against its directors for negligence and mismanagement); Mullins v. De Soto Securities Co., Inc., 56
F. Supp. 907 (W.D. La. 1944), (stockholder derivative action against dominant stockholders of a
securities company) aff'd, 149 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1945).
150. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, at 30 n.2, (citing N. LATrIN, LATTIN ON CORPORATIONS § 78,
274 (2d ed. 1971)).
151. N. Lattin, supra note 106, at 274.
152. Veasey and Manning, supra note 99, at 926-29. The question was resolved in Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984), in favor of a gross negligence standard.
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cite an exhaustive study by the late Professor Joseph Bishop.153 Bishop
concluded that directors were only held liable for gross negligence, and
that the "ordinary care" standard was mere dicta. Despite the descrip-
tions of the standard by the courts, Bishop concluded that "[tihe hard
fact is that cases in which directors of business corporations are held
liable, at the suit of stockholders, for mere negligence are few and far
between." 1 54 Aside from the special category of bank cases, 55 Bishop
found only four cases where directors of industrial corporations arguably
have been held liable in derivative suits for ordinary negligence."5 6 Even
in those cases he concluded that the ordinary care standard was mere
dicta, and that the decision was based on other grounds. As Bishop put
it, "none of these cases carries real conviction." '157 A discussion of each
will demonstrate how suspect they indeed are as support for a duty of
ordinary care for directors.
Clayton v. Farish sustained a complaint charging negligence on the
part of directors in their dealings with a cartel.15 The complaint alleged
that in every instance the defendant directors acted in the best interests
of one of the cartel members, and against the interests of their corpora-
tion, Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey.159 While the opinion articulates
the ordinary care standard,1 " it also articulates a gross negligence stan-
dard. 6 ' More revealing, perhaps, are the conflict of interest charges,
which demonstrate that the case really involved a breach of the duty of
loyalty. The complaint alleged that the directors were in fact bribed by
one of the cartel members, which delivered 500,000 shares of its stock to
153. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, at 41-42 n.7, citing Bishop, supra note 80, at 1099-1100.
154. Bishop, supra note 80, at 1095.
155. Id. at 1095-99, text accompanying nn. 63-86.
156. Id. at 1099. See also Bishop, Type of Liability to Which Corporate Directors and Officers are
Subject and Methods of Protection Against Such Liability, in PLI, PROTECTING THE CORPORATE
OFFICERS AND DIRECTOR FROM LIABILITY, 327 (1970) ("[A] quite diligent research effort which I
had a couple of students conduct a few years ago failed to turn up any case involving an industrial
corporation in which it was possible to say that the director was held liable for ordinary negligence
in managing the company's affairs.").
157. Bishop, supra note 80, at 1100.
158. 191 Misc. 136, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. 1947).
159. Id. at 740 ("The defendant, as a director of a corporation, should have taken the same care
of its property that men of average prudence take of their own property.") (citing Cardozo J. in
General Rubber Co. v. Benedict, 215 N.Y. 18, 23, 109 N.E. 96 (1915).
160. Id. at 740 ("Directors are liable 'if they suffer the corporate funds or property to be lost or
wasted by gross negligence and inattention to the duties of their trust.' ").
161. Id. at 740.
19881
Washington University Open Scholarship
270 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
one defendant for a group of three dominant directors. 162 The court
stated that the negligence claim "also contains sufficient allegations to
charge the defendant directors with fraud." 16
3
Bishop noted that there was a "cogent dissent" to New York Credit
Men's Adjustment Bureau v. Weiss, and that the case has never been fol-
lowed in New York. 16 In Syracuse Television, Inc. v. Channel 9, Syra-
cuse, a derivative action alleging excessive salary payments to employees
survived a motion to dismiss. 165 As Bishop points out, the court could
hardly dismiss the complaint, since it was "cast in the terms of the stat-
ute."' 16 6 Neither the Weiss case nor the Channel 9 case involved affirm-
ance of damage awards against the directors. In Weiss the case was
remanded for a determination of whether the directors' actions damaged
the company, while in Channel 9 the case merely went forward to
trial. 167
The final case discussed by Bishop is Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of
America, a derivative action for waste and mismanagement. 168 The cor-
poration had raised funds to acquire and operate a plant in Pennsylvania
through an intrastate offering exemption from securities registration. Af-
ter acquiring the funds, and over the objections of counsel, they poured
virtually all the funds into an inferior facility in another state. The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court was faced with a statute that required directors
to exercise such care as an ordinarily prudent man would exercise "in
their own affairs", which the court recognized was not the majority view
in the United States. The court held it would make no difference
whether the usual standard applied or that of the new statute if the direc-
tors were guilty of "gross mismanagement."' 169 The court noted that
"[i]t is beyond explanation, why, in the face of such knowledge of the
unsuitability of the Paterson plant for profitable production, the defend-
ants continued to pour corporate money into and to utilize the Paterson
plant."' 0 Again, there were hints of conflicts of interest. The court
noted that the trial court had found suspicious circumstances, including
162. Id. at 751.
163. Id. at 740.
164. Bishop, supra note 80, at 1100 n.95 (citing 305 N.Y. 1, 110 N.E.2d 397 (1953)).
165. 51 Misc.2d 188, 273 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
166. Bishop, supra note 80, at 1100.
167. 51 Misc.2d 188, 273 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
168. 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966).
169. Id. at 582, 224 A.2d at 645.
170. Id. at 570, 224 A.2d at 639.
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the use of an intermediary to purchase equipment that mysteriously dis-
appeared. These circumstances created "a reasonable inference of willful
misconduct and a pattern of self-enrichment by the managing defendants
... and [this] militates against their good faith and fair dealing." '171 Pro-
fessor Bishop concluded that this case does not carry conviction on im-
position of liability for ordinary negligence, because the directors
actually appear to have been held liable for gross negligence, and because
"the facts are heavy with the odor of self-dealing."' 72
IV. THE BusINEss JUDGMENT RULE
Much of the furor concerning the ALI's proposals centers on the treat-
ment of the business judgment rule.'73 The ALI's formulation of the
business judgment rule appears in section 4.01(c):
(c) A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith
fulfills his duty under this Section if:
(1) he is not interested [1.15*] in the subject of his business
judgment;
(2) he is informed with respect to the subject of his business
judgment to the extent he reasonably believes to be appropriate
under the circumstances; and
(3) he rationally believes that his business judgment is in the best
interests of the corporation. 174
Subsection (c) does not contain the requirement that the director act
with the care of an ordinarily prudent person in a like position. How-
ever, that requirement is in effect supplied by the repetition of a require-
ment that the director "reasonably" or "rationally" believe in the
appropriateness of his actions-an objective standard, which can only be
grounded in the behavior of a reasonably prudent person. 17 5
The relationship between the conduct rule of section 4.01(a) and the
171. Id. at 572, 224 A.2d at 640.
172. Bishop, supra note 80, at 1100. See also Phillips, supra note 132, at 660, n.25.
173. See generally T.D. No. 1, supra note 1, § 4.01(d); T.D. No. 3, supra note 1, § 4.01(d) and
T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(c). For a prominent and adverse reaction to these provisions see
Business Roundtable Statement, supra note 65, at 46-51.
174. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(c).
175. The Reporters concede that "reasonably believes" in the context of the inquiry requirement
has both a subjective and an objective content, and that it is intended to have a meaning generally
consistent with its use in analogous areas of the law, relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 11 (1965). T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(a)(l)-(a)(2), comment at 45. See also T.D. No. 4, supra
note I, § 4.01(c), comment at 67.
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decision rule of section 4.01(c) illustrates that the two rules are extraordi-
narily difficult to separate. Section 4.01(a) sets out the duty of a director,
requiring him to perform in good faith in a manner he reasonably be-
lieves to be in the best interests of the corporation, with ordinary care. 76
The nature of the "reasonable belief" requirement is elaborated; it "in-
cludes the obligation to make... such inquiry as the director... reason-
ably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances." '177 Section
4.01(c) sets out the business judgment rule principally as a series of quali-
fications to director immunity. If the director is not interested in the
transaction, he does not violate his duty of care if he was informed with
respect to the subject of the business judgment "to the extent he reason-
ably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances", and if he "ra-
tionally believes that his business judgment is in the best interests of the
corporation." In either event, the statement of the business judgment
rule closely parallels the statement of directors' duties. To that extent it
merges conduct and decision rules by electing the prior conduct rule over
the former decision rule.
This standard subjects a decision of the board to three discrete areas of
judicial scrutiny. A director's interest in the transaction has been a tradi-
tional area of inquiry, and raises no new issues. But the ALI raises the
issue of whether the director was "reasonably informed" to the extent he
"reasonably believed necessary" at the time of the decision, which raises
questions of the quantum of information possessed when a decision was
made. This perverts the business judgment rule, which presumed an in-
formed decision, and placed the burden of proof on the plaintiff. The
ALI has converted a presumption into a prerequisite. The ALI project
also introduces a new inquiry: whether the decision has a "rational ba-
sis," which raises questions about the thought processes of directors.
The following discussion examines the conditions imposed on the busi-
ness judgment rule by the ALI, and all of the cases cited by the Reporters
in support of their statements of law. The holdings of these cases simply
do not support the claims made for them by the Reporters. If there is
authority to support their position, they have totally failed to marshal it.
176. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(a).
177. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(a)(1).
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A. The Reasonable Inquiry Requirement
1. The ALl Formulation
The condition that the director must be informed to the extent he rea-
sonably believed appropriate under the circumstances is tied by the offi-
cial commentary to the requirement of section 4.01(a)(1). Section
4.01(a)(1) states that the director's duty of care "includes the obligation
... to make such inquiry as the director or officer reasonably believes to
be appropriate under the circumstances." 178
The support for this requirement is commentary or dicta to the effect
that in applying the business judgment rule, "it is presupposed that judg-
ment-reasonable diligence-has in fact been exercised." 179 Here the
move from presumption to prerequisite is made explicit. The justifica-
tion, as the Reporters point out, "is to encourage directors and officers to
put themselves in a position to make as informed and careful a decision
as circumstances permit."180 This is an explicit merger of conduct and
decision rules, with the emphasis on the conduct rule.
The official comments state that various preparatory decisions to the
making of a business decision, such as how much information or advice
to acquire in evaluating a new product or project, are protected by the
business judgment rule.1"1 This commentary concedes that directors
may be under severe time pressure under certain circumstances, which
may compel "risk taking, which includes the risk of not having all rele-
vant facts concerning a proposed transaction.... ,,182 The commentary
further states that "[a] decision to accept the risk of incomplete informa-
178. See T.D. No. 3, supra note 1, § 4.01(d)(3) ("had a rational basis for believing .... ), and
T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(c) comment at 64 ("The great weight of case law and commentator
authority supports the proposition that an informed decision, [made after reasonable inquiry], is a
prerequisite to the legal insulation afforded by the business judgment rule."). Commentary in T.D
No. 1 disclaims an intent to impose all of the duty of care requirements on directors as a prerequisite
to the availability of the business judgment rule, conceding that the rule would then be superfluous.
T.D. No. 1, supra note 1, § 4.01(d) comment b, at 206. This disclaimer has been dropped from T.D.
No.4, suggesting even closer judicial scrutiny than the earlier drafts.
179. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(c) at 64, (citing Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643
(Sup. Ct. 1944)); Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 394 (2d Cir. 1980); H.
BALLANTINE, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 638 at 161 (rev. ed. 1946).
180. T.D. No. 1, supra note 1, § 4.01(d) comment b at 206-07 (citing Arsht, The Business Judg-
ment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 93, 111 (1979) and an unpublished manuscript of one of
the reporters, Small, The Rights and Duties of Directors Under the Business Judgment Rule 12 (un-
published manuscript 1981)).
181. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1 § 4.01(b) comment at 56.
182. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1 § 4.01(c) comment e, at 65.
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tion, so long as the director reasonably believes such informational risk
taking to be appropriate under the circumstances, will be fully consistent
with the application of the business judgment rule ....
But what one comment gives, another takes away, by limiting the cir-
cumstances under which decisions made on less than perfect information
may be defended. The illustrative circumstances given by the commen-
tary that justify acting on less than complete information involve a pro-
spective white knight, facing a decision to bid for a target where target
shareholders must make a decision on a pending bid within two days, so
that the opportunity will be lost forever if no decision is reached immedi-
ately. Further, the illustration points out that most of the target's activi-
ties and assets have been carefully evaluated, so the areas of incomplete
information are confined to a small but significant aspect of the target's
business.184 The implication is that only the most urgent of circum-
stances will justify operating on less than perfect information in making a
business decision. This example ignores the real world, in which many
hostile tender offers are made solely on the basis of publicly available
information, without benefit of "due diligence."
2. The Real Law of Inquiry
The ALI's verbal formulation finds support in the standard treatises
and in dicta in judicial opinions. However, it fails to capture the extent
of judicial deference to directors' decisions about how much information
was required to reach an informed judgment. It does not appear to be an
extraordinary statement for the reporters to say not that directors are
presumed to have acted in an informed manner, but that the safe harbor
of the business judgment rule "presupposes a deliberative process and an
informed decision." '85 In the context of the ALI project this must be
read to mean not that these elements are presumed, but rather that direc-
tors must prove them before becoming entitled to the protection of the
business judgment rule. Unfortunately, the cases cited in the reporter's
note to the introductory comments do not entirely support this claim. 186
Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp., (a case challenging the validity
of the decision) holds not that directors must exercise an informed judg-
ment, but that they must exercise "independent" judgment, and that the
183. Id. at 65.
184. Id. § 4.01(c) comment f, at 67-70. The tenor of illustration 2, id, at 71-72, is similar.
185. T.D. No. 1, supra note 1, Part IV, introductory comment c, at 133.
186. T.D. No. 1, supra note 1, Part IV, introductory comment e, at 137, 139-40.
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decision not be tainted by the interest of a single director who had deter-
mined to oppose a takeover "at all costs."1"7 While the deliberative pro-
cedures used by the board have subsequently been cited as models, that
discussion was not necessary to the holding of the case.1 8  Schein v. Cae-
sar's World, Inc., cited by the Reporter to support a requirement of rea-
sonable care, can only be described as a "phantom footnote" that lends
no support whatever to the statement.18 9 The court of appeals affirmed
per curiam the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant
directors, attaching the unpublished opinion of the district court as an
appendix.
Evans v. Armour & Co. is consistent with the claim that the business
judgment rule presupposes a decision that "has been exercised reasonably
and with due care."'" But the cases cited by the Evans opinion stand
only for the proposition that directors "are liable only where they are
grossly negligent or fraudulent."191 Thus Evans represents a questiona-
ble application of controlling precedent.
Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc., another case challenging the validity
of a business decision, contains dicta to the effect that the business judg-
ment rule "requires the Court to start from the normal presumption that
Signal's Board of Directors acted in good faith in approving the sale
... ,"192 The court held that the rule weighs in favor of the directors'
decision "unless the complaining shareholders can prove fraud or a
clearly inadequate sale price," which must be "so clearly inadequate as
constructively to carry the badge of fraud."' 193 Thus, the case would
more appropriately support a statement about the nature of the presump-
tions and deference to be given a decision once reached. It is unfortunate
that the Reporters have chosen to rely on a particularly naive Delaware
187. 638 F.2d 357, 383-84 (2d Cir. 1980). Indeed, citing a takeover case is particularly inappro-
priate in a general statement of the business judgment rule, since these cases present special circum-
stances, which the ALI has generally reserved for Part VI of the project.
188. See infra text at notes 250-63 for a discussion of the use of Treadway in the Hanson Trust
decision.
189. 491 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1974). "Phantom footnotes" have previously been observed in the
work of Nader, Green & Seligman, CONSrrriONALIZING THE GIANT CORPORATION, supra note
10, by R. Hessen, Creatures of the State? The Case Against Federal Chartering of Corporations,
BARRON'S, May 24, 1976, reprinted in 1976 Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 21, 24.
190. 241 F. Supp. 705, 713 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
191. Zweifach v. Scranton Lace Co., 156 F. Supp. 384, 395 (M.D. Pa. 1957).
192. 316 A.2d 599, 608 (Del. Ch. 1974).
193. 316 A.2d at 609, citing Marks v. Wolfson, 41 Del. Ch. 115, 123, 188 A.2d 680, 685 (Del.
Ch. 1963).
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Supreme Court decision on valuation issues.' 94 If anything, the case il-
lustrates that those dealing with corporations in times of price fluctua-
tions may find their agreements renegotiated by the courts, if hindsight
and price fluctuations subsequently suggest the directors made a wrong
(but not uninformed) guess about future prices. 195
Cases cited in the Third Tentative Draft provide no more support for
the reasonable inquiry requirement. Indeed, Joy v. North provides sup-
port for greater judicial deference. The opinion holds only that directors
may not completely abdicate their authority to others, that "[d]irectors
who willingly allow others to make major decisions affecting the future of
the corporation wholly without supervision or oversight may not defend
on their lack of knowledge, for that ignorance is a breach of fiduciary
duty."'196 The opinion describes certain directors as having been "left in
the dark," which suggests they had no information whatever, and raises
questions of active concealment of conflicts of interest by some inside
directors.197 The case stands only for the proposition that directors who
delegate decisions to others and choose to remain in total ignorance may
be liable, unless they can show an excuse for their failure to stay abreast
of the consequences of their delegation.
B. The Rational Basis Requirement
L The ALI Formulation
The "rational basis" prerequisite for protection of the business judg-
ment rule is closely related to the informational requirement. 198 In Ten-
194. In Gimbel the court was persuaded of the prima facie inadequacy of the sale price by the
wide disparity in the appraisals of experts for each side, thus in effect choosing to believe (or give
weight to) the opinions of one side, when no evidence or reasons were cited for this preference. The
court, in effect, exercised its own business judgment about value. For a discussion of the ease with
which experts can create wide differences in valuations by varying assumptions about appropriate
discount rates see Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law, 1983 AM. BAR FOUD. RaS. J.
875, 891. There is dicta in Gimbel indicating that the board should have obtained more current
information about value before approving the sale, which is consistent with the ALI's position.
195. All contracts are bets about future prices, and assignments of the risk of price fluctuations,
with the buyer bearing the risk of a decline in value, and the seller bearing the risk of an increase in
value.
196. 692 F.2d 880, 896 (2d Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983), cited in T.D. No. 3, at
59.
197. 692 F.2d at 896.
198. In T.D. No. 1, supra note 1, and T.D. No. 3, supra note 1, § 4.01(d)(3) the requirement was
that a director must have "had a rational basis" for the business judgment. In T.D. No. 4, supra
note 1, § 4.01(c) requires that "he rationally believes that his business judgment is in the best inter-
ests of the corporation."
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tative Draft No. 1 the Reporters introduced this concept with the claim
that while "[t]he black letter formulation of the business judgment rule
...is new, ... each of its basic elements is supported by substantial
precedential authority."1 99 The commentary further states that this is a
more liberal standard than the formulation in some cases that the busi-
ness judgment must be "reasonable" to be upheld.20 The commentary
rejects a simple "good faith" test as providing "too much legal insulation
for directors and officers."' This apparently rejects a presumption of
reasonable decision-making where good faith and a lack of conflicts of
interest are shown.
Once again, the formulation is inconsistent even with the formulation
of the rule in the cases cited by the Reporters. Prominent among them
are cases that refer to the test as one of whether "any rational business
purpose can be attributed" to the decision.20 2 The cases cited in the re-
porter's note to section 4.01(c) of Tentative Draft No. 4 contain much
stronger language: "so unwise or unreasonable as to fall outside the per-
missible bounds of the directors' sound discretion .. . ;2o3 "business
judgment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross neg-
ligence"; 2  and unless "so gross as to appear absurd."2"5 The difference
between the obvious liberality of the judicial formulations of the rule and
the ALI's formulation has already led to a judicial weighing of evidence
and reasons for decisions that would intrude well into the management
process. 6
The cases cited by the ALI Reporters include a case involving chal-
lenges to the decisions themselves-whether the directors' actions should
be set aside for lack of such a rational basis and purpose, rather than
199. T.D. No. 1, supra note 1, § 4.01(d) comment, at 192; see also T.D. No.3, supra note 1,
§ 4.01(c), comment a, at 58 ("The formulation of the business judgment rule set forth in § 4.01(d) is
believed to be consistent with present law as it would be interpreted in most jurisdictions today
200. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(c) comment f, at 68.
201. Id. at 69.
202. Id. at 67, (citing Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir. 1981) and
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971)).
203. Cramer v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1129 (1979), cited in T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, at 68, 75.
204. Aronson v. Lewis, supra note 152 at 145, cited in T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, at 75.
205. Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11 (1872), cited in T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, at 76.
206. See infra, cases cited at subpart D of this Part.
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claims of director liability.2 07 Hinsey has characterized the business
judgment doctrine as protecting directors, decisions, and the business
judgment rule as protecting directors themselves from liability.20 8 This
blurring of the rule and the doctrine obscures the cost to corporations of
rendering all corporate decisions subject to renegotiation in the courts at
the instance of an unhappy shareholder.
2. The Real Law
A close inspection of the few cases cited in support of the rational basis
test demonstrates that the reporters have created a straw man, in the
form of a "reasonableness" test, which they reject in favor of protecting
only decisions with "a rational basis. ' 20 9 Instead, the real choices should
have been between a gross negligence test and a good faith test, both of
which find more support in the case law, even in those cases cited by the
Reporters. The move to a rational basis test seems innocuous enough at
first blush, especially in view of the distraction of an alternative of "rea-
sonableness", which involves fuller judicial review. Yet application of
the rational basis test in recent decisions demonstrates the dramatic im-
pact such a shift in language can make. The notion of a "rationally
based" decision seems to have been transformed by some courts into a
balancing of the possible costs and benefits of a decision. This is a dra-
matic and inappropriate intrusion into the boardroom. Indeed, the ver-
bal formulation of the test in Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc., cited by
the Reporters for the duty of inquiry, draws on an earlier opinion that
defers to directors' decisions on price "unless the inadequacy is so gross
as to display itself as a badge of fraud" and "can be explained only on the
theory of fraud, or a reckless indifference to the rights of others
interested. ' 210
A reading of the cases cited by the reporters makes two propositions
clear. First, courts support directors' decisions for which, in hindsight,
there is any rational basis, or any business purpose. Second, in doing so,
there is much support for a standard phrased in terms of more traditional
207. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., supra note 202, involved a suit for injunctive relief as well
as for damages in connection with defensive responses to a hostile takeover bid.
208. See generally Hinsey, Business Judgment and the American Law Institutes' Corporate Gov-
ernance Project: The Rule, the Doctrine, and the Reality, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 609 (1984).
209. See T.D. No. 1, supra note 1, at 209 and § 4.01(d), Reporter's Note, at 213; T.D. no. 4.
supra note 1, at 67-68 and § 4.01(c), reporter's note, at 75-76 for rejection of the reasonableness test.
210. Gimbel v. Signal Co., Inc., supra note 192, at 152, 316 A.2d at 610, (citing Allied Chemical
& Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. 1, 19, 120 A. 486, 494 (Del. Ch. 1923)).
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language of standards of care-that directors' decisions will be upset, and
directors held liable, only for gross negligence. Some of these cases pro-
vide support for a standard rejected by the ALI-that decisions will not
be upset in the absence of fraud, illegality or bad faith.211 Couching the
business judgment rule in these terms would have done much to clarify
the traditional judicial deference to business decisions. An examination
of the decisions cited by the reporters in three drafts of the ALI project
demonstrates that the overwhelming weight of authority supports either
a good faith or a gross negligence version of the rule.
Cases cited that support decisions made with "any rational business
purpose" include Panter v. Marshall Field & Co. (a takeover defense case,
validating the decision);2" 2 Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien;2 "3 and Whittaker
Corp. v. Edgar, (a takeover defense case, validating the decision).2" 4
The alleged support for a "reasonableness" requirement demonstrates
that the Reporters were only searching for a straw man to demonstrate
that their proposed shift in the business judgment rule was a modest one.
Cases cited for the "reasonableness" requirement include only Cramer v.
General Tel. & Electronics Corp., a derivative action "demand excused"
case. The Cramer opinion states no more than the proposition that
courts retain some power to review the reasonableness of decisions of
special litigation committees-a matter of considerable controversy, but
not dispositive of the rule in business decisions, since decisions to dismiss
are mixed questions of legal and business judgment.215 McDonnell v.
American Leduc Petroleums, Ltd. contains dicta about the business judg-
ment rule, in the face of total abdication of responsibility by a director.
The director interpreted a promise she made to state regulators to allow
honest and independent managers to remain in office as a promise of total
passivity as a director, which the court held was not a "reasonable" inter-
pretation.2" 6 Abbey v. Control Data Corp., cited for the proposition that
the business judgment cases provide broader protection to directors than
211. The cases cited are found in T.D. No. 1, supra note 1, at 139-40 and T.D. No. 4, supra note
1, at 64-68 and 74-76.
212. 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
213. 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
214. 535 F.Supp. 933, 950 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (applying Delaware law).
215. 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978), (dismissing derivative suit for failing to make a demand
on the board), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979). The court did not determine whether state or
federal law governed. It is clear that the discussion of the extent of judicial review was merely dicta
because it was not necessary to the decision.
216. 491 F.2d 380, 384 (2d Cir. 1974).
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a reasonableness test, is no longer good law.2 17 That opinion applied the
business judgment doctrine to a board decision to terminate a derivative
action, while later Delaware decisions have declined to do so, in view of
the potential "structural bias" of special litigation committees.218
Some cases cited simply have no bearing on the business judgment
rule. Myers v. Moody, for example, was a fraud case, where the jury
found gross negligence on the part of the defendant.219
Other cases support a rule rejected by the ALI-that directors' deci-
sions can be challenged only for fraud or bad faith. Indeed, one such
case, Kamin v. American Express Co.,220 is cited not for that proposition,
but as a case that omitted reference to both "reasonableness" and "ra-
tional basis" in setting forth business judgment criteria.221 While, that
characterization is literally true, it is disingenuous, since the comments
fail to explain that these phrases were omitted because the court adopted
an even more deferential standard.
At the same time, the reporters provide much support for a rule of
either gross negligence or fraud or bad faith as the standards of the busi-
ness judgment rule. Among the cases cited are Spering's Appeal, ("unless
so gross as to appear absurd"); 222 Warshaw v. Calhoun, ("bad faith.., or
a gross abuse of discretion . . . ,1)223 and Gimbel v. Signal Companies,
Inc., ("unless the inadequacy [of price] is so gross as to display itself as a
badge of fraud" and "can be explained only on the theory of fraud, or a
reckless indifference to the rights of others interested").224 Most impor-
tantly, they cite the opinion of the leading court for corporate law, in its
landmark decision in Aronson v. Lewis.225 There the Delaware Supreme
Court stated that the business judgment rule "is a presumption that in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on a in-
formed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
217. 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980), cited in T.D. No. 3, supra
note 1, at 71.
218. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981), holding that the court should apply
its own business judgment to review a decision of a special litigation committee to terminate a deriv-
ative action, where doubts remain about the independence of the committee.
219. 693 F.2d 1196, 1210 (5th Cir. 1982).
220. 86 Misc.2d 809, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 54 A.D.2d 654, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993
(N.Y.App.Div. 1976).
221. T.D. No. 3, supra note 1, at 71.
222. 71 Pa. 11 (1872).
223. 43 Del. Ch. 148, 157-58, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (Sup. 1966).
224. Supra note 192, at 152.
225. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
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was in the best interests of the company." '22 6 The court then reviewed all
of its prior holdings in the area, and concluded that "under the business
judgment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross neg-
ligence."227 To state the rule while ignoring this statement, which is the
law applicable to an enormous percentage of all large American business
corporations, can hardly be regarded as an accurate statement of existing
law.228 Addressing the requirement of a rational basis, the court stated
that the rule "has no role where directors have either abdicated their
functions, or absent a conscious decision, failed to act." '229 As the court
pointed out, "[t]he burden is on the party challenging the decision to
establish facts rebutting the presumption."230
Thus the case law supports a much stronger statement of the business
judgment rule which would clarify that directors, absent conflicts of in-
terest, are entitled to a presumption of adequate investigation and good
faith in their decisions. That presumption places a burden on those com-
plaining of director action to demonstrate the total lack of facts, or of
investigation, or of possible reasons, to support a decision.
C. The Real World-Investigation Is a Matter of Business Judgment
Information, like any other good, is costly to produce, and rational
decision-makers will only produce it up to the point where the expected
benefits from more information are equal to the marginal costs of pro-
226. Id. at 812.
227. Id. (citing Veasey & Manning, Codified Standard - Safe Harbor or Uncharted Reef?, supra
note 99, at 928). Note 6 of Aronson, supporting the conclusion, stated:
While the Delaware cases have not been precise in articulating the standard by which the
exercise of business judgment is governed, a long line of Delaware cases holds that director
liability is predicated on a standard which is less exacting than simple negligence. Sinclair
Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971), rev'g, 261 A.2d 911 (Del. Ch. 1969)
('fraud or gross overreaching'); Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 887 (Del.
1970), rev'g, 255 A.2d 717 (Del. Ch. 1969) ('gross and palpable overreaching'); Warshaw v.
Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (Del. 1966) ('bad faith... or a gross abuse of discretion')'
Moskowitz v. Bantrell, 190 A.2d 749, 750 (Del. 1963) ('fraud or gross abuse of discretion');
Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349, 351 (Del. Ch. 1972) ('directors may breach
their fiduciary duty... by being grossly negligent'); Kors v. Carey, 158 A.2d 136, 140 (Del.
Ch. 1960) ('fraud, misconduct or abuse of discretion'); Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 147
A. 257, 261 (Del. Ch. 1929) ('reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the
stockholders').
473 A.2d at 812 n.6.
228. Jonathan Macey of Cornell Law School has calculated that as of January 1, 1986 43.3% of
all companies listing equity securities on the New York Stock Exchange were incorporated in Dela-
ware. 1 NYSE GUIDE (CCH), 70-107, 725-99.
229. 473 A.2d at 813.
230. Id. at 812, (citing Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch. 1971)).
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duction. The difficulty is that the benefits from more information gener-
ally cannot be known until the information is actually acquired. It may
be that the first bit of information acquired by a board about an upcom-
ing decision correctly points the direction, but one remains uncertain
about it until all information has been acquired. That may be an impos-
sibly costly task, both in time and resources, and business executives, like
others, are faced with the choice of how far to go in pursuit of informa-
tion before deciding. Where the range of choices or possible outcomes is
small the expected benefits from additional information will also be
small. On the other hand, where the range of possible outcomes is large
the expected payoffs from obtaining further information are likely to be
larger, holding the costs of search constant.231 But at the beginning of a
search, the decision-makers may not be fully aware of the range of ex-
pected outcomes, and thus may be uncertain about the payoffs from more
information. Experienced directors and business executives will have
better means for estimating the range than those lacking such experience,
such as judges and attorneys.232
Thus experienced business executives presenting a decision to a board,
or those sitting the board, will know from experience the likelihood that
further investments in information acquisition will produce important
new facts that may alter the decision. They will, of course, be mistaken
from time to time; it may be that the very next piece of information could
have protected the corporation from a loss. But that is the nature of the
predictive process: decisions are made under conditions of uncertainty.
This rather formal description of the decision-making process is sup-
ported by observers of board practices. The board typically is presented
with a flow of information in connection with a wide variety of decisions
over time, all of which adds to the background against which each suc-
cessive decision is made.233 Decisions are not made as before courts or
administrative agencies; common background information will be as-
sumed, not presented for the record. Decisions about how many ques-
tions to ask or whether to request reports from outside experts, or further
exploration by management, are informed by the past experience of di-
231. The basis for this description is drawn from Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J.
POL. ECON. 213 (1961).
232. Id. at 218-19.
233. Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention: Time for Real-
ity, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477, 1494 (1984) ("the heart of the director's true responsibility is attention to
his ongoing multiple functions: a process, a flow of events, a continuum of the company's current
history.").
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rectors with the value of such additional searches. In most cases, unless
a lawyer is present orchestrating events, decisions about whether to
search for more information will not be made explicit. Practical business
executives will act without what they regard as superfluous discussions of
what they might know under ideal and hypothetical conditions.
D. The Consequences of Judicial Review of the Quantum of
Information
Several decisions announced since the appearance of Tentative Draft
No. 1 provide the only support for the ALI's statements of the business
judgment rule. Those decisions also illustrate the perils of following such
a rule. They threaten the quality of corporate decisions and the risks
directors will be willing to undertake.
1. Ex Post Determinations of the Adequacy of Information
Smith v. Van Gorkom represents a landmark in the decisions of the
Delaware Supreme Court.2"4 The court held that in the sale of the busi-
ness of Trans Union Corporation the directors failed to reach an in-
formed decision where the CEO of the company played an active role in
initiating the sale and in setting the price, but neglected to describe all of
the details of the negotiations to the board, and where the board was
"uninformed as to the intrinsic value of the Company." '235 Finally, the
court held, disagreeing with the board's construction of a contract not in
the record, that the directors "had no rational basis for expecting that a
market test was attainable." '236
The court's treatment of intrinsic value is illustrative of the difficulties
to be encountered when courts inquire on their own whether a decision is
an "informed" one. The proposed contract presented to the board called
for the sale of the business for $55 per share when its stock had previ-
ously been trading at $38.237 The company had been frustrated by its
inability to utilize its investment tax credits, and the board was aware
that a business combination, whether by acquisition or sale, presented a
reasonable means for obtaining full benefit from its tax situation.2 38 Be-
cause no investment banker rendered an opinion on the "intrinsic value"
234. 488 A.2d 868 (Del. 1984).
235. Id. at 874.
236. Id. at 878.
237. Id. at 867.
238. Id. at 864-65.
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of the company or the fairness of the price, and because no such opinion
was provided by anyone on the corporate staff, the court held that the
board was not fully informed when it agreed to sell the company for
nearly a 40% premium over its then market value.239 The tragedy is the
court's naive assumption that such a thing as "intrinsic" value exists for
a firm. No respectable financial economist or investment banker would
attempt to assign an "intrinsic value" to a financial asset.24' Its only
value is its ability to produce a stream of future benefits for its owners, in
dividends or appreciation, capitalized at the appropriate discount rate.241
In this case, the assets, viewed as a tax shelter, had a determinable value
in the hands of those able to utilize the shelter, as Trans Union was not.
Internal calculations could be made by Trans Union officials of the tax
savings, and hence cash flow increases, available to any buyer, and fur-
ther calculations could also be made on how much debt this cash flow
would support. The premium over the market was a substantial one,
lending further credence to a conclusion that the decision was a reason-
able one.
In efficient capital markets prices provide that information with a high
degree of accuracy, and investors as well as directors can rely on market
prices as the consensus of intelligent traders and investors about value.242
It is the market, not expert witnesses, that selects the appropriate capital-
ization rate.243 Only where material non-public information exists is it
likely that market prices may not fully reflect the best possible judgment
239. Id. at 878.
240. The leading finance text contains no reference whatever to "intrinsic value." See generally
R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (2d ed. 1984). Mr. Justice White
recently expressed his doubts about judicial efforts to determine the related concept of "fair" or
"true" value. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.-, 108 S.Ct. 978, 993, 996 (1988) (dissenting opinion
of White, J.).
241. For a general description of valuation, see BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 240 at 61-83.
See also FISCHEL, supra note 194.
242. For a general description of the efficient capital markets hypothesis, see LORIE & HAMIL-
TON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE, 70-110 (1973). Much work has been done
to corroborate this hypothesis, making it one of the best established in the social sciences. See, e.g.,
Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970);
Friend, The Economic Consequences of the Stock Market, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 212 (1972); Gordon &
Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U.L. REV. 761
(1985); Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets Where Traders Have Diverse In-
formation, 31 J. FIN. 573 (1976); Comment, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic
Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1977).
243. FISCHEL, supra note 194, at 891, suggests how readily experts can manipulate valuation
formulae to achieve desired (and radically disparate) appraisals of firms.
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about value. There was no mention of the presence of such information
in the Trans Union opinion. Indeed, where, as here, the business in-
volves passive ownership of fungible investment assets, the presence of
such information is highly unlikely. In its attempt to prove that intrinsic
value was different from market value, the court cited only the testimony
of several directors to the effect that most chief executives think the mar-
ket undervalues their companies' stock.2" It is hardly surprising that
most CEOs believe their efforts are not fully appreciated, but it is not
evidence of undervaluation, either systematic or sporadic. The evidence
is all to the contrary.245
The result was that the court upset a decision made by a disinterested
board, charged with no fraud or illegality, on the recommendation of a
CEO with a substantial ownership interest, because the court did not
believe these directors had sufficient information to protect their decision
under the business judgment rule. As one dissenting justice pointed out,
the five inside directors had 68 years of combined experience, while the
five outside directors had 53 years cumulative experience as directors of
this company. One outside director was an economist, formerly a profes-
sor of economics at Yale, dean of the Graduate School of Business at the
University of Chicago, and presently Chancellor of the University of
Rochester. The other four were Chief Executives of major business cor-
porations.246 As the dissenting justice observed, "[d]irectors of this cali-
ber are not ordinarily taken in by a 'fast shuffle.' "247 The dissent
describes the opinion as a "comedy of errors.""24 That description has
been echoed by later commentators.249
Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc. represents the first
explicit application of the ALI's approach to a business judgment.250
SCM Corporation was the subject of a hostile tender offer by Hanson,
and sought, through its investment bankers, to locate a white knight for a
competing bid.251 Out of 40 companies contacted, only one, Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc ("Merrill") was seriously interested.
244. 488 A.2d at 876.
245. See authorities cited supra note 242-43.
246. 488 A.2d at 894.
247. Id. at 894.
248. Id. at 894.
249. See, eg., Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW.
1437 (1985).
250. 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
251. Id. at 268.
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In return for its commitment to make a bid for the entire company, Mer-
rill obtained an engagement fee and a "breakup fee" if another bidder
succeeded, thus assuring some compensation for the expenses the bidder
was about to undertake.252
When Hanson increased its hostile bid in response to Merrill's offer,
Merrill declined to proceed with a new and higher bid without further
compensation. In order to induce the white knight to make an even
higher bid, SCM offered lock-up options on its "crown jewels"-its most
attractive divisions-if Hanson should succeed. 253 The option prices
were approved by a disinterested board after receiving an investment
banker's opinion that the option prices were "within the range of fair
value. ' 254 The result of the lock-up was, as expected, termination of
Hanson's bid, because Merrill could have purchased major assets at
prices representing less than full value if Hanson's bid had succeeded.255
In essence, when the bidding had stopped, in order to induce a higher bid
from Merrill, SCM's board gave an option that would induce one more
(higher) bid.
Applying New York law, the court held that the board's duty of care
requires "reasonable diligence" in gathering and considering material in-
formation-citing the ALI's formulation in T.D. No. 4.256 But the court
declined to presume that the judgment was made on adequate informa-
tion. Instead, the court proceeded with its own examination of the ade-
quacy of the valuation information the board possessed at the time it
approved the lock-up. 257 As Judge Kearse's dissent put it, "while pur-
porting to apply the business judgment rule, the majority proceed[ed] to
engage in extensive exploration of asset valuation of the sort normally
reserved to corporate directors."25 8 Aside from reliance on the opinions
of respected investment bankers and outside corporate counsel, the board
asked questions on virtually all aspects of the options open to them.259
252. Id. at 269.
253. Id. at 270-71.
254. Id. at 271.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 274 (citing T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(c)(2)).
257. "Thus, while directors are protected to the extent that their actions evidence their business
judgment, such protection assumes that courts must not reflexively decline to consider the content of
their 'judgment' and the extent of the information on which it is based." 781 F.2d at 275.
258. Id. at 286.
259. [T]he directors asked questions as to, inter alia,
- the valuation of the Merrill Lynch deal,
- the possibility that Hanson would raise its bid,
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The majority focused rather on questions the board did not ask, and
information the investment bankers did not supply. Indeed, the majority
seemed to turn the question of what constitutes the proper amount of
information into a question of law, by citing the steps taken in Treadway
Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp. as evidence of what this board should have
done.2" Thus, the court believed that SCM's directors should have
"'armed' their bankers with financial questions to evaluate; ... requested
balance sheets; ... adjourned deliberations for one week to consider the
requisitioned advice; and ... conditioned approval of the deal on secur-
ing a fairness opinion from their bankers." '2 61 Accordingly, the majority
held that the directors failed to exercise due care in informing themselves
of material information, and set aside the lock-up options as unfair. The
court rejected the trial court's holding that valuation involves a business
judgment, and rejected the justification that some kind of an option was
required to obtain a better bid from the white knight. The court pointed
to the fact that the lock-up ended the bidding as evidence that no benefit
redounded to SCM and its shareholders from the lock-up.2 62
In so holding the court had to ignore the fact that the lock-up induced
a $74 bid when the hostile bid was at $72.263 The court failed to under-
stand the bidding contest. The contest was over when Merrill announced
its withdrawal. At that point, Hanson had no incentive to increase its
$72 bid. While the lock-up may have ended the bidding, it did so at a
higher price than Hanson was then willing to pay. Thus, in determining
the adequacy of information about value, the court became enmeshed in
a debate about whether the lock-up was necessary to secure a higher bid.
- whether asset options such as that proposed had been legally upheld,
- the Goldman Sachs evaluation of the Merrill Lynch deal and the evaluation of the
debentures,
the possibility of a shareholder suit,
the trigger of the asset option,
what parts of the SCM business Hanson was interested in,
the impact of the proposed deal on the employees of the company,
the continuing viability of the company,
- whether a higher price might be obtained for these assets,
what the equity ownership of the new company would be under the new deal, and
whether Merrill Lynch would do the deal without the asset option.
Id. at 290 (dissenting opinion of Judge Kearse).
260. Id. at 275 (citing Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 384 (2d Cir.
1980)).
261. 781 F.2d at 275.
262. Id. at 282-83.
263. Id. at 271, 281.
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This question is necessarily a business judgment. The majority did not
even understand the nature of the bidding game.
Not all courts have read section 4.01 as suggesting such an intrusive
role for the judiciary. In the context of board approval of a white
knight's bid, the Sixth Circuit has read Ohio law, as informed by the
ALI's project, as requiring the plaintiff to show that directors acted in
bad faith "or without requisite objectivity" before directors must defend
their actions. 2 4
2. Bureaucratization of Corporate Decision-Making
Two lessons become clear for corporate counsel advising boards dur-
ing decisions about selling the corporation. First, the paper record must
be replete with information normally part of the background knowledge
of directors, and with explicit information from experts designed to per-
suade courts that sufficient information was presented. Second, to the
extent that less than one hundred percent of the possible information is
presented to the board, explicit discussions should take place, for the rec-
ord, of the cost considerations and time constraints that justify proceed-
ing on less than a one hundred percent record. No matter how complete
the presentations of management and outside experts, care should be
taken to demonstrate that the board engaged in an independent inquiry,
and indeed, made its own determination of whether there is a sound basis
for any expert opinions.26- Directors must now inquire about the nature
of the facts investigated by investment bankers, according to the Hanson
majority.266 Indeed, both opinions suggest that it is not enough that
opinions are given about the range of fair values, or that the price offered
is not unfair; experts should give a precise valuation opinion, as if there
were a single determinable "intrinsic" value.2 67  In short, directors
should be aided by their attorneys and investment bankers in papering
the record.
264. Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 257 (6th Cir. 1985). The court stated that "Ohio courts
adhere to the 'business judgment rule,' and will not inquire into the wisdom of actions taken by the
directors in the absence of fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion." Id. at 256.
265. See 488 A.2d at 877.
266. 781 F.2d at 276 ("The directors did not seek any documents in support of Goldman Sachs'
conclusory opinion", and that other facts "should have led the directors to investigate, rather then
rely baldly upon, the oral opinion as to fairness.").
267. 781 F.2d at 276; 488 A.2d at 891.
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V. THE RESPONSE TO LAW REFORM
Dean Richard West, now of the New York University Business
School, predicted the results of the ALI's characterization of the duties
and liabilities of directors. He argued that it would deter qualified candi-
dates from serving on corporate boards, and would lead those remaining
to be more cautious, "to take less risk, and be less innovative."26 He
also noted the "prospect of more derivative suits, with all of the various
costs attendant thereto."269 While no comprehensive empirical studies
have been performed, the evidence, to a casual empiricist, is overwhelm-
ingly in support of West's prediction. Even the first hints of judicial ac-
ceptance of the changes suggested by the ALI, coupled with other forces,
have caused a disruption of corporate practices. If increases in liability
insurance premiums for officers and directors are a proxy for increased
derivative suits, the evidence clearly supports West's last prediction. In
the face of the unavailability of liability insurance, or drastic changes in
exclusions and deductibles, outside directors have resigned in large num-
bers. Increased caution and reduced risk-taking and innovation are more
difficult to observe, because they involve opportunities not seized. But
there was one thing Dean West did not predict: beginning with Dela-
ware, in response to Trans Union, there has been remarkably rapid and
widespread legislative response, generally in the form of permission for
corporations, through charter amendments, to contract out of director
liability for violations of the duty of care.
A. The Liability Crisis
It is not the purpose of this article to provide a comprehensive survey
of the "liability crisis" that has faced corporate officers and directors in
the past several years. The evidence of that crisis appeared in the re-
sponse of insurance companies that issue directors' and officers' liability
insurance. One study found that renewal premiums rose an average of
362% in 1985.270 Another study indicated that liability insurance premi-
ums rose 506% for a sample of Fortune 1,000 companies from 1985 to
1986.271 Some 20% of the sample experienced increases of 1,000% or
268. West, supra note 44, at 642-43.
269. Id. at 643.
270. Insuring Directors, Wall St. J., Mar. 21, 1986, at 31, col. 3 (citing a study by Korn/Ferry
International).
271. HEIDRICK & STRuGGLEs, THE CHANGING BOARD, 11 (1986).
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more.272 Some observers attributed much of the increase to the Trans
Union decision.273
At the same time, the policies had exclusions that made them worth
less to those covered. For example, it was common to exclude coverage
for decisions made in response to a hostile takeover bid.274 Deductibles
increased, and policy limits were reduced.275
Those companies were the lucky ones. Others, especially in troubled
industries, found liability insurance impossible to obtain at any price.2 76
Troubled banks, oilfield drilling companies, and computer companies all
found themselves without coverage.2 77 In many cases outside directors
resigned.27 While some companies could offer adequate indemnification
agreements, companies facing the risk of bankruptcy could not offer
credible promises.
The result was a perceived reduction in the quality of corporate
boards. Some companies simply lacked outside directors. Others
searched for replacements with low enough net worths so the company
could indemnify them. In other cases, where directors remained, some
observers felt that director decisions would be more cautious, even when
risk-taking was called for.27 9
B. The Hidden Cost: The Decision Crisis
The threat of liability will lead directors to approach new opportuni-
ties more cautiously, and inevitably will cause them to forego some op-
portunities they otherwise would have seized for their firms. These lost
transactions cannot be seen and thus cannot be quantified. This cost of
272. Id. Armada Corporation was reported to have had its premium raised from $45,000 to
$720,000, an increase of 1600%. Director Insurance Drying Up, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1986, at 29, 31.
273. Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom after Van Gorkum, 41
Bus. LAW. 1, 6 (1985).
274. Firms May find Insuring Boards is Getting Easier, Wall. St. J., Jan. 13, 1987, at 31, col. 3.
275. Director Insurance Drying Up, supra note 272. The article indicated that coverage limits
had been reduced to $10 - $30 million from limits of as much as $50 - $150 million the previous year.
In the case of Armada Corporation, the deductible increased from $125,000 to $750,000. By 1987
coverage limits were recovering. Firms May Find Insuring Boards Is Getting Easier, supra note 274.
276. Director Insurance Drying Up, supra note 272. By 1987, there was evidence of some easing
of the scarcity problem, although for many companies premiums were expected to continue rising,
perhaps 10% to 15% in 1987. Firms May Find Insuring Boards Is Getting Easier, supra note 274.
277. Director Insurance Drying Up, supra note 272. For an account of some of the claims against
directors and officers of banks, see generally Galante, The D & 0 Crisis: Corporate Boardroom Woes
Grow, The National Law Journal Aug. 4, 1986, 1.
278. Director Insurance Drying Up, supra note 272.
279. Id.
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overregulation is typically a hidden cost that is frequently ignored. It is
nonetheless real.
Another cost, more apparent, is the increase in transaction costs re-
sulting from a judicial willingness to examine the "rational basis" for
every transaction. Lawyers and investment bankers have become regular
cast members in what has become a repertory theater, producing and
performing paper scripts for the benefit of a very small audience. They
are not bit players. Indeed, in some cases they take the leading roles, and
they are always paid in a manner befitting their status as stars in the cast.
Similarly, the cost of expected judicial revisiting of corporate commit-
ments, and renegotiation of corporate contracts, makes these contracts
less valuable to those dealing with corporations. The price a white
knight may be willing to pay for a firm decreases to reflect the uncertain-
ties surrounding the enforceability of the agreement reached.
C. The Legislative Response
Two of the three major decisions that might be credited with precipi-
tating the liability crisis involved challenges to the decisions, rather than
claims of director liability. In that light, one might expect reform pro-
posals to focus on the conduct rule, since observation of the conduct rule
by directors would presumably protect both the decision and the deci-
sion-makers. But so far that has not generally been the case. The only
legislation that protects the corporate decision is that which focuses on
responses to hostile takeovers.2"' The balance of the legislative response
focuses exclusively on protecting directors from liability.
Delaware, the traditional leader in corporation law innovations, was
the first to respond to these problems. Its approach was contractarian
and enabling: to allow corporations to amend their charters to effectively
preclude liability for violations of the duty of care.2 81 But Delaware was
280. These statutes typically expand directors' discretion to consider constituencies other than
shareholders in evaluating bids for control. Typical of these statutes is the Indiana version:
A director may, in considering the best interests of a corporation, consider the effects of
any action on shareholders, employees, suppliers, and customers of the corporation, and
communities in which offices or other facilities of the corporation are located, and any
other factors which the director considers pertinent.
IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1(d) (Bums Supp. 1986). See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716,
amended by P.L. 394, L. '85; MiNN. STAT. 302A-251(5), amended by Ch. 1, Ist Spec. Sess., L. '87;
Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.347(4) (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35.B, amended by Ch. 238, L. '87;
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E)(4); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42 § 8363(b) (Purdon); Wis.
STAT. § 180.305 as amended by 1987 Wis. Laws 13, 8.
281. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) provides that articles of incorporation may set forth:
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not alone; a majority of states have introduced or passed legislation con-
cerning directors' liability since Trans Union.282 A few states have gone
further, and have simply limited director liability for negligence gener-
ally. Virginia has provided a cap on directors' and officers' liability.2"3
Other states have redefined the decision rule, restoring (or going be-
yond) the business judgment rule. Indiana provides that directors are
liable only where a breach of duty constitutes willful misconduct or reck-
lessness. 84 Ohio requires clear and convincing evidence of a breach of
duty "undertaken with deliberate intent to cause injury to the corpora-
tion, or undertaken with reckless disregard for the best interests of the
corporation," and extends the business judgment rule's protection to
(7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corpora-
tion or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director
provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director (i) for any
breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders, (ii) for acts or
omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation
of law, (iii) under section 1974 of this Title [unlawful payment of dividends], or (iv) for any
transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit. ***
282. Hanks, State Legislative Responses to the Director Liability Crisis, 20, No. 3 REV. SECURI-
TIES & COMMODITIES REG. 23 (1987). A later report by Hanks provides information on additional
states that have adopted charter opt-in statutes. See generally Hanks, Update on State Legislative
Responses to the Director Liability Crisis, 21, No. 3 REV. SECURITIES & COMMODITIES REG. 23
(1988). Essentially the same language as in the Delaware statute appears in ARiz. REv. STAT. § 10-
054(A)(9), amended by 1987 Ariz. Sess. Laws. ch. 129, 3; 1987 Ark. Acts 958; CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 204(a)(10), amended by A.B. 1530, 1 (1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-2-102(1.5)(d) and § 7-3-
101(l)(u), amended by 1987 COLO. SESS. LAWS 1142, GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-171(b)(3), amended
by 1987 GA. LAWS 657; IOWA CODE § 491.5 and § 496A.49, amended by 1987 Iowa Acts 212;
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6002(b)(8), amended by S.B. 26 (1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:24(C)(4),
amended by La. Acts 1987, 261; MASS. GEN. ch. 156B, § 13(b)(1-1/2); MICH. COMP. LAW
21.200(209)(c), amended by 1987 Mich. Pub. Act 1; MINN. STAT. § 302A.I 11, subd. 4(u) and
302A.251, subd.4 (1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-202(2)(e), amended by 1987 Mont. Laws 559;
NEV. REv. STAT. § 78, amended by 1987 NEV. STAT. 28, 2; N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:2-7(3); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 53-12-2.E (1988 Cum. Supp.); N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. § 402(b), amended by 1987, N.Y.
Laws 367; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7, amended by 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 626, 1; OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, 1006(B)(7), amended by 1987 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 183, 1; 1987 Ore. Laws ch. 52; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 42 § 8364 (Purdon); RI. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-48(b)(6), amended by 1987 R.I. Pub. Laws,
87-146; 1987 S. Dak. Laws ch. 340; TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 7.06(b) (Vernon), amended by 1987
Tex. Gen. Laws S.B. 260; UTAH CODE,ANN. § 16-10-49.1, amended by 1987 Utah laws ch. 166, 1;
WASH. REV. CODE 23A.12.020, amended by 1987 Wash. Laws ch. 212, 701; and in 1987 Wyo. Sess.
L. Ch. 208.
283. VA. CODE § 13.1-692.1, amended by S. 404 (1986).
284. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e)(1988) provides:
(e) A director is not liable for any action taken as a director, or any failure to take any
action, unless:
(1) the director has breached or failed to perform the duties of the director's office
in compliance with this section; and
(2) the breach or failure to perform constitutes willful misconduct or recklessness.
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control transactions. 8 5 Ohio does permit corporations to opt out of
these provisions by charter amendment.28 6
These statutes will have the ultimate effect of making the duty of care
a dead letter as a decision rule for many directors. They also have the
effect of making at least some directors' duties a matter of contract rather
than of public policy. 287 That in itself may be the most fundamental
change.
VI. CONCLUSION
Changes in language can work subtle changes in substance. That, I
believe, is the result of the ALI's treatment of the duties and liabilities of
the corporate board. From aspirational language and the literature of
managerialist criticism of the modem business corporation the reporters
have managed to patch together a complex pattern of subtle changes that
would, if left unchallenged, change the role of the modem board. De-
spite denials that these statements change existing law, the reaction to
the few cases that have adopted the ALI's approach to reviewing board
actions suggests the contrary. The disruption of established corporate
patterns was dramatic, and has been followed by one of the most remark-
ably consistent and rapid changes in corporation statutes in our history.
The American Law Institute has a long and distinguished history of
impartiality and accuracy in its statements of the law. The Corporate
Governance Project departs from that tradition in significant ways that
call into question the continued viability and credibility of the organiza-
tion. Ultimately, one must wonder: Can the ALI survive a project that
lacks the characteristics that have been the hallmark of the organization?
285. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(c) - (F). Ohio may thus be unique in protecting the
decision, as well as the decision-makers. Whether such protection, in the context of defensive tactics
against corporate takeovers, is appropriate is another question. My own view is that it is not. Car-
ney, Controlling Management Opportunities in the Market For Corporate Control: An Agency Cost
Model, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 385 (forthcoming).
286. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (Anderson 1987).
287. Economists, unlike lawyers, have described the corporation as a "nexus for a set of con-
tracting relationships among individuals." Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976).
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